Akron Law Review
Volume 41

Issue 1

Article 2

2008

Foolish Consistencies and the Appellate Review Of Courts-Martial
John F. O'Connor

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will
be important as we plan further development of our repository.
Recommended Citation
O'Connor, John F. (2008) "Foolish Consistencies and the Appellate Review Of Courts-Martial," Akron
Law Review: Vol. 41 : Iss. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss1/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at
IdeaExchange@UAkron, the institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of
IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please contact mjon@uakron.edu,
uapress@uakron.edu.

O'Connor: Appellate Review of Courts-Martial
O'CONNOR_FINAL

3/23/2009 2:31 PM

FOOLISH CONSISTENCIES AND THE APPELLATE REVIEW
OF COURTS-MARTIAL
John F. O’Connor*
The most pronounced adverse impact [of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice] upon the military justice system appears in the intricacies and
delays attending appellate review. Since convicted persons have a
right to appeal they may delay the final disposition of cases although
the petition for review may be entirely without merit and even when it
follows an original plea of guilty. Moreover, because of delays in the
appeal process, convicted persons receiving short sentences of
confinement may have served their sentences before the procedure
prescribed by the Code is completed. . . . This involves great expense
to the taxpayer and, because of the frivolous nature of the appeal, is
1
generally of no value to the accused.

I. INTRODUCTION
The post-September 11, 2001 world has highlighted an important
evolution in the way that the United States military justice system is
perceived by courts, legal scholars, journalists, and the public at large. 2
With extensive media reporting of military operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq, a spotlight has been shone on the military justice system as it
* Partner, Steptoe & Johnson LLP. B.A., University of Rochester; M.S.Sc., Syracuse University;
J.D., University of Maryland School of Law. The author served as an officer in the United States
Marine Corps from 1988 to 1998, including service as a judge advocate from 1995 to 1998. The
views expressed herein are those of the author only, and do not reflect the views of Steptoe &
Johnson LLP or its attorneys or clients.
1. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, SEMI-ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 1 JANUARY TO JUNE 30, 1953, 122 (1953), quoted in
George S. Prugh, Jr., Observations on the Uniform Code of Military Justice: 1954 and 2000, 165
MIL. L. REV. 21, 27-28 (2000).
2. James W. Smith III, A Few Good Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib Courts-Martial and the
Failure of the Military Justice System, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 671, 693 (2006) (referencing
December 2002 news article as “the first evidence that criticism of the military justice system had
made its way to the mainstream press”).
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has tackled a number of issues relating to these military operations. 3
Journalists and legal scholars have written extensively about the reports
of detainee abuse from Iraq, most notably at Abu Ghraib prison, and the
Courts-martial of
court-martial proceedings flowing therefrom. 4
servicemembers refusing to deploy to Iraq, based either on their
contention that the Iraq war is illegal 5 or on their claims of conscientious
objector status, 6 have piqued the public’s interest as part of the larger
debate on the Iraq war. In assessing the legality of military commissions
created to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the Supreme Court
considered the due process protections inherent in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (“UCMJ”), 7 the criminal code for trying
servicemembers by court-martial. 8
What is particularly striking is the shift in public and scholarly
perceptions of the military justice system as compared to those
expressed in the Vietnam War era. With the United States mired in a
Vietnam War that was unpopular in many quarters, courts’ and scholars’
treatment of the military justice system bordered on derision. 9 The title
of a popular Vietnam-era book offered a characteristically glib put-down
of the military justice system: Military Justice is to Justice as Military
Music is to Music. 10 Congress, animated by its own perceptions of the

3. See, e.g., Michael J. Davidson, Congressional Investigations & Their Effect on
Subsequent Military Prosecutions, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 281, 325-26 & n.254 (2006).
4. See, e.g., id; U.S. Military Justice Proceedings Involving Alleged Offenses Against
Protected Persons, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 713, 713-15 (2005); Additional U.S. Military Justice
Proceedings Against Servicemembers for Alleged Abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan, 99 AM. J. INT’L
L. 503, 503-05 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Rone Tempest, They Also Serve Their Conscience, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 8121286 (referencing Army court-martial of officer who refused
deployment to Iraq on grounds that deployment was illegal); Army War Resister Takes on New
Lawyers for Retrial, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 6, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
6740241.
6. See, e.g., Mary Spicuzza, An Army of Uno, S.F. WEEKLY, June 20, 2007, available at
2007 WLNR 12386348 (detailing court-martial of sailor court-martialed for refusing to deploy with
his ship after the Navy denied his application for conscientious objector status).
7. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006) [hereinafter U.C.M.J.].
8. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2786-93 (2006).
9. See, e.g., ROBERT SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS TO
MUSIC 212-13 (1970) (“Justice is too important to be left to the military. If military justice is
corrupt – and it is – sooner or later it will corrupt civilian justice.”).
10. Id.; see also Robert E. Montgomery, Jr., Comment, God, the Army, and Judicial Review:
The In-Service Conscientious Objector, 56 CAL. L. REV. 379, 447 (1968) (questioning the ability of
the military justice system to safeguard the rights of soldiers claiming conscientious objector status);
Howard E. Cohen, Comment, The Discredit Clause of the UCMJ: An Unrestricted Anachronism, 18
UCLA L. REV. 821, 827 (1971) (criticizing court-martial system’s ability to protect constitutional
rights); U.S. Military Justice on Trial, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 31, 1970, at 18 (“The Uniform Code of
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inadequacies of courts-martial, introduced a number of bills in the early
1970s that if enacted into law would have, among other things,
prohibited courts-martial from trying offenses committed in the United
States except for a small class of purely military crimes. 11 The principal
sponsor of these bills, Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, declared in 1971
that it was “a shameful fact that this nation, which prides itself on
offering ‘liberty and justice for all,’ fails to provide a first-rate system of
justice for the very citizens it calls upon to defend those principles.” 12
Indeed, in a 1969 decision, the United States Supreme Court
characterized courts-martial as meting out “so-called military justice”
and being “marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive
justice.” 13
By contrast, misgivings by members of the public and the academic
community regarding military operations in Iraq have not, for the most
part, manifested themselves in negative characterizations of the quality
of justice available at courts-martial. 14 If there has been one reasonably
persistent recent criticism of the military justice system, it has concerned
who was subjected to trial by court-martial, with commentators
observing that detainee abuse courts-martial tended to focus on lowerranking soldiers and not their military superiors. 15 But this criticism is
in itself remarkable. Where forty years ago commentators assailed the
very ability of courts-martial to dispense justice, current complaints have
focused on the fact that the court-martial net was not cast wider in order
to prosecute the military superiors of those actually tried by courtMilitary Justice is uniform, is a code and is military – and therefore has nothing to do with justice.”)
(quoting Charles Morgan, Jr. of the American Civil Liberties Union).
11. See Frederick Bernays Wiener, American Military Law in the Light of the First Mutiny
Act’s Tricentennial, 126 MIL. L. REV. 1, 67-68 (1989) (detailing legislative attempts in the early
1970s to narrow the reach of courts-martial).
12. See Kenneth J. Hodgson, The Manual for Courts-Martial-1984, 57 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2
(1972) (quoting a statement by Senator Bayh in a 1971 issue of Parade magazine). Senator Bayh
also made a statement in connection with these bills in which he opined that, in addition to problems
of command influence, the court-martial system “denies a defendant other rights fundamental to a
free society.” See 117 CONG. REC. S2551 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1971).
13. O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265-66 & n.7 (1969); see also id. at 266 (“None of
the travesties of justice perpetrated under the UCMJ is really very surprising, for military law has
always been and continues to be primarily an instrument of discipline, not justice.”).
14. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 2, at 676 (criticizing “[t]he disparate treatment between
enlisted soldiers and officers”).
15. See, e.g., id. at 673-74; Victor Hansen, What’s Good for the Goose is Good for the
Gander Lessons from Abu Ghraib: Time for the United States to Adopt a Standard of Command
Responsibility Towards Its Own, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 338-41 (2007); Harold H. Koh, Can the
President Be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145, 1151 (2006); Christopher A. Britt, Note,
Commissioning Oath & the Ethical Obligation of Military Officers to Prevent Subordinates from
Committing Acts of Torture, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 551, 553 & n.25 (2006).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 2
O'CONNOR_FINAL

178

3/23/2009 2:31 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:175

martial. 16
Boiled down, this is an argument that implicitly
acknowledges the inherent fairness of courts-martial, as the critics have
urged additional courts-martial rather than seriously challenging the
merits of the courts-martial actually conducted. 17
Similarly, where the Supreme Court forty years ago was openly
dismissive of the truth-seeking abilities of courts-martial, the Court in
2006 invalidated the President’s military commission regulations based
in part on its conclusion that Congress required military commissions to
have the same due process as courts-martial, with the Court identifying
several areas where the proposed military commissions fell short in that
regard. 18 The Supreme Court’s holding out of courts-martial as the
exemplar of due process to which military commissions must aspire is
but the latest step in the rehabilitation of courts-martial as justicedispensing entities in the eyes of the Supreme Court. 19
Recent platitudes aside, there are, in this author’s view, serious
deficiencies in the military justice system that are, for the most part, out
of the general public’s view. These deficiencies concern not the conduct
of courts-martial themselves, but the way that courts-martial are
reviewed on appeal. 20 Simply put, the military appellate courts review
too many cases because the system inadequately separates cases that
involve litigable appellate issues from cases that do not. 21 In particular,
the military justice system requires full-blown appellate review in
virtually all courts-martial in which the approved sentence exceeds a
relatively modest threshold, even in cases where the accused pleads
guilty and receives exactly the sentence he requests. 22 Remarkably, this
appellate review system allows – indeed, encourages – accuseds
pleading guilty as part of a plea bargain to turn around on appeal and
argue that their convictions should be overturned. 23
No civilian criminal justice system would tolerate appellate review
in the circumstances in which the military regularly permits courtmartial appeals. 24 As a result of this flawed process, court-martial

16. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 15, at 676.
17. See id.
18. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2786-93 (2006).
19. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s evolving perception of courts-martial, see John F.
O’Connor, Statistics and Military Deference: A Response to Professor Lichtman, 66 MD. L. REV.
668, 692-94 (2007).
20. See infra Part III.D.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(b), art. 66(b) (2006).
23. See infra Part III.D.
24. See infra Part III.A.
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proceedings actually have less finality than the typical civilian criminal
proceeding, when the government’s interest in achieving finality is
considerably greater in the military justice context. 25
But the cost of a bloated military appellate review system is not just
the abstract loss of finality; there are considerable opportunity costs
imposed by this process. With such a broad class of cases subject to
mandatory appellate review, it is hardly surprising that the appellate
review pipeline is chock full of relatively simple guilty plea cases that
present no colorable appellate issues whatsoever. 26 Every hour that is
spent in processing these guilty-plea appeals is an hour that is diverted
from the appellate review of courts-martial involving issues that were
highly contested at trial. This one-size-fits-all aspect of appellate review
diverts resources not only from highly contested courts-martial
presenting real appellate issues, but also forces the services to devote
resources to the military appellate system that, if there were a more
slimmed-down appellate caseload, could be used for other military
imperatives.
The crushing caseload caused by the mandatory appellate review of
guilty-plea cases necessarily creates delays at every level of appellate
review. 27 It is hardly surprising, then, that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces (“CAAF”) – the civilian court sitting atop
the military justice appellate structure – has encountered a number of
cases involving post-trial and appellate delays of embarrassing
durations. 28 The only durable solutions to this problem appear to be
either throwing additional resources at the problem at every stage
without changing the system itself, or taking a hard look at the military
appellate caseload with an eye toward reducing the number of cases
reviewed on appeal. 29 Any such effort to narrow the class of courtsmartial subject to mandatory appellate review should focus on
eliminating appeals where the accused has no moral right to appellate
review – such as where the accused essentially raised no appealable
issues at trial – while not being so overly broad as to capture cases where
an accused may have legitimate issues to raise on appeal. 30
The thesis of this Article is that most of the vices infesting the

25. See infra Part III.B.
26. See infra Part III.D.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 137 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (“While appellate
defense counsel’s caseload is the underlying cause of much of this period of delay . . . .”).
28. See infra Part III.E.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. Id.
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military appellate system could be corrected, or at least moderated, by
reforming the rules governing when, and how, a servicemember can
waive his right to appellate review. Under the system as it currently
exists, an accused is prohibited from agreeing to waive appellate review
of his court-martial as part of the plea bargaining process. 31 This
process ensures that an accused can waive his appellate review rights
only when there is no way for him to get anything in return. Not
surprisingly, then, appellate review waivers are exceedingly rare.
If an accused were permitted to waive his appellate rights as part of
the plea bargaining process, however, he could actually obtain
something – sentencing relief – for saving the government the burden of
appellate review. 32 Where the accused has pleaded not guilty at trial, or
pleads guilty without the benefit of a plea bargain, the accused’s
appellate review rights would be completely unaffected. 33 The proposed
reform, then, likely would reduce the overall appellate caseload
considerably, but would not eliminate the appellate review rights of
accuseds who truly value those rights. 34 The result would be a more
coherent appellate process that eliminates many of the deficiencies
associated with the current system.
Part II of this Article examines the “costs” associated with the
appeal of a court-martial conviction, that is, the resources that are
required to bring a case through its appellate review. 35 When a courtmartial appeal presents colorable issues that the accused has a moral
right to raise (not having waived them at trial), these are “costs” that are
well worth expending. 36 But where an appeal presents no colorable
issues, or where the accused by his conduct has waived any legitimate
right to pursue his arguments on appeal, these costs become an
unnecessary and unwise burden to impose on the military justice
system. 37
Part III of this Article explores the arguments in favor of reforming
the military appellate review framework. An analysis of the military
appellate review system demonstrates that it disserves the military’s
interest in finality of criminal proceedings, and gives accuseds perverse
incentives to take inconsistent positions at trial and on appeal, something
31. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, RULES FOR COURTS MARTIAL 705(b),
(c) (2005) [hereinafter R.C.M.].
32. See infra Part IV.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See infra Part II.
36. Id.
37. Id.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss1/2

6

O'Connor: Appellate Review of Courts-Martial
O'CONNOR_FINAL

3/23/2009 2:31 PM

2008]

APPELLATE REVIEW OF COURTS-MARTIAL

181

that never would be permitted in the civilian context. 38
Most
troublesome, the military appellate review system fails to differentiate
between cases that present substantial issues raised and preserved at trial
and the fairly common case where the accused pleads guilty and raises
no issues whatsoever at trial. 39 By subjecting both types of cases to the
same appellate review, the military appellate system harms accuseds
seeking to raise contested issues on appeal because their appeals are
delayed while largely frivolous cases wind their way ahead of them in
the appellate pipeline. 40
Part IV of this Article examines potential ways to address the
inefficiencies of the military appellate system. 41 Ultimately, the most
effective reform is one that is market based, that essentially allows
accuseds to self-select as to whether they will pursue an appeal of their
court-martial. 42 Rule for Court-Martial 705(c) 43 prohibits accuseds from
dealing away their appellate rights in the plea bargaining process.
Changing that rule would help separate the appellate wheat from the
chaff, as accuseds who have no colorable issues to raise at trial would be
highly likely to waive appellate review as part of a plea bargain. 44 Such
a trend would free up appellate resources to deal with substantial
appellate issues raised by accuseds who actually contested matters at
trial, while taking appellate rights away from only those accuseds who
value the benefits of a plea agreement over their right to pursue an
appeal. 45
II. THE “COSTS” OF A COURT-MARTIAL APPEAL
Article 66(a) of the UCMJ requires that the Judge Advocate
General of each service establish a Court of Criminal Appeals to hear
court-martial appeals. 46 In the absence of waiver, these courts review all
courts-martial where the approved sentence includes death, a punitive
discharge, or confinement for one year or more. 47 In Fiscal Year 2005,
the service Judge Advocates General received records of trial for 3,364
courts-martial that were subject to mandatory appellate review under
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.D.
Id.
See infra Part IV.
Id.
R.C.M. 705(c), supra note 31.
See infra Part IV.
Id.
U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(a), art. 66(a) (2006).
Id. § 866(b), art. 66(b).
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Article 66. 48 For every one of these courts-martial, there are significant
resources expended in completing this mandatory appellate review.
Once the military judge bangs her gavel to conclude a courtmartial, the appellate review process essentially begins. Where the
adjudged sentence, if approved, would trigger mandatory appellate
review, the court reporter must prepare a verbatim transcript of the
proceedings. 49 Once completed, the record of trial is delivered to the
prosecutor, called the trial counsel, who reviews the record of trial to
“ensure that the reporter makes a true, complete and accurate record of
the proceedings.” 50 If no unreasonable delay will result, the trial counsel
also provides a copy of the record of trial to the accused’s defense
counsel, before authentication, so that the defense counsel can examine
the record of trial and propose any additional corrections. 51 Once the
record of trial has been reviewed by the trial counsel, and any
appropriate corrections are made, the record of trial is delivered to the
military judge who presided over the court-martial for review and
authentication. 52
Once the military judge authenticates the record of trial, a copy is
served on the accused or his defense counsel. 53 The authenticated record
of trial also is provided to the convening authority, the military
commander who referred the charges to court-martial, who has the
power to approve or disapprove of the findings or sentence of the courtmartial. 54 However, there are a number of procedural steps that must
take place before the convening authority is permitted to take action on a
record of trial. 55
First, once the accused (or his counsel) has been served with the
48. See Annual Report of the Code Committee on Military Justice, Fiscal Year 2005, § 3 at
app. 1 (noting that the Army had 954 records of trial processed for Article 66 review); § 4 at app. 1
(noting that the Navy and Marine Corps had a total of 1,835 records of trial processed for Article 66
review); § 5 at app. 1 (noting that the Air Force had 543 records of trial processed for Article 66
review); § 6 at app. 1 (noting that the Coast Guard had 32 records of trial processed for Article 66
review), available at http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/Annual.htm.
49. R.C.M. 1103(b)(2)(B) (setting forth instances in which a verbatim transcript must be
prepared for general courts-martial); R.C.M. 1103(c) (setting forth circumstances in which a
verbatim transcript is required for special courts-martial). Where an accused has been convicted,
but a verbatim transcript is not required, the court reporter may prepare a “summarized report of the
proceedings” for inclusion in the record of trial. R.C.M. 1103(b)(2)(C).
50. Discussion, R.C.M. 1103(i)(1)(A).
51. R.C.M. 1103(i)(1)(B).
52. R.C.M. 1104(a)(2)(A). If the military judge is unavailable to authenticate the record of
trial, R.C.M. 1104(a)(2)(B) provides for alternative means of authenticating the record of trial.
53. R.C.M. 1104(b)(1)(A), (C).
54. R.C.M. 1106(a).
55. See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
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authenticated record of trial, the accused has ten days in which to submit
matters for the convening authority to consider. 56 In this submission, the
accused can argue that errors committed at the court-martial affect the
legality of the findings or sentence, can submit materials in mitigation
that were not available at the time of the court-martial, and can provide
materials in support of a request that the convening authority reduce the
severity of the adjudged sentence as a matter of clemency. 57 The tenday deadline for submission of such matters by the defense may be
extended by the convening authority or his staff judge advocate. 58
Once the accused has submitted post-trial materials for
consideration by the convening authority, or the deadline for submitting
such materials has passed, the record of trial and any submitted post-trial
materials are routed to the convening authority’s staff judge advocate or
legal officer for review. 59 The staff judge advocate or legal officer is
required to submit a report to the convening authority to assist the
convening authority in taking action on the adjudged sentence. 60 This
report has a number of mandatory issues to be addressed, and must
include a specific recommendation as to the action to be taken by the
convening authority with respect to the adjudged sentence. 61 If the
accused’s post-trial submission alleges legal error during the courtmartial proceedings, a staff judge advocate’s report also must address
whether corrective action should be taken. 62 In addition to the required
subjects, a staff judge advocate’s recommendation can include other
materials deemed appropriate by the staff judge advocate or legal
officer, including material from outside the court-martial record. 63
Before the record of trial can be forwarded to the convening
authority for action, however, the report and recommendation of the staff
judge advocate or legal officer must be served on the accused and his
defense counsel. 64 The accused’s counsel is permitted ten days from
service of the staff judge advocate or legal officer recommendation to

56. R.C.M. 1105(c)(1).
57. R.C.M. 1105(b).
58. R.C.M. 1105(c)(1).
59. R.C.M. 1106(a).
60. R.C.M. 1106(d)(1).
61. R.C.M. 1106(d)(3).
62. R.C.M. 1106(d)(4).
63. R.C.M. 1106(d)(5).
64. R.C.M. 1106(f)(1). The accused also can elect to have the report and recommendation
served solely on defense counsel, and the staff judge advocate or legal officer can serve the report
and recommendation solely on defense counsel, even over the accused’s objection, where it is
impractical to serve the accused. Id.
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submit comments on the recommendation. 65
Once all of these
procedures have been accomplished, the record of trial is forwarded to
the convening authority. 66 In taking action on the record of trial, the
convening authority is required to take action on the sentence, and is
permitted to take action on the findings. 67 The convening authority may
approve the findings as adjudged at trial, or he may change a finding of
guilty to a finding of guilty to a lesser included offense, or the convening
authority can set aside one or more findings of guilty and either dismiss
the charges or order a rehearing on them. 68 As for the adjudged
sentence, the convening authority can approve the sentence as adjudged,
or can disapprove the adjudged sentence in whole or in part, or change
the punishment adjudged so long as the change does not increase the
severity of the accused’s punishment. 69
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the process of readying a
record of trial for a convening authority’s action is a labor-intensive one,
but it is just the first step in the appellate review process. Nevertheless,
the convening authority’s action is an important line of demarcation,
particularly as it relates to an accused’s right to waive appellate review
of his court-martial conviction. 70 The accused’s deadline for filing a
waiver of appellate review is ten days after the accused or his counsel is
served with the convening authority’s action. 71 Importantly, however,
the rules for courts-martial are structured to ensure that an accused can
never obtain anything of value for waiving his right to appellate review
of his court-martial conviction. 72
65. R.C.M. 1106(f)(5). The staff judge advocate or legal officer may supplement his
recommendation to address the comments submitted by the accused’s defense counsel. R.C.M.
1106(f)(7). However, if this addendum contains new matter, it must be served on defense counsel
and defense counsel must be provided ten days to comment on the new matter before the record of
trial is forwarded to the convening authority for action. Id.
66. R.C.M. 1107.
67. Id.
68. R.C.M. 1107(c).
69. R.C.M. 1107(d). A number of cases have considered whether the convening authority’s
change in the sentence from one type of punishment to another had the effect of increasing the
accused’s punishment. Paradoxically, these cases typically arise when the change in punishment by
the convening authority came at the specific request of the accused, such as where the accused asks
the convening authority to increase the period of any confinement in return for not approving a
punitive discharge from the service. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 45 M.J. 168, 170 (C.A.A.F.
1996); United States v. Lee, 43 M.J. 794, 799 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1995).
70. See R.C.M. 1107(c).
71. R.C.M. 1110(a), (f)(1). After the deadline for waiving appellate review has passed, an
accused may withdraw appellate review by filing a notice of withdrawal either with the service
Judge Advocate General or with the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the
accused. R.C.M. 1110(e)(2).
72. See United States v. Baker, 28 M.J. 121, 122 (C.M.A. 1989).
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First, R.C.M. 705(c) prohibits pretrial agreements (the military term
for a plea bargain) from including any provision that would deprive the
accused of “the complete and effective exercise of post-trial and
appellate rights.” 73 Second, the rule concerning waiver of appellate
rights expressly provides that “[n]o person may compel, coerce, or
induce an accused by force, promises of clemency, or otherwise to waive
or withdraw appellate review.” 74 Given that the rules require an
affirmative act by an accused to waive his right to appellate review, and
yet prohibit an accused from receiving any consideration for executing
such a waiver, it is hardly surprising that waivers of appellate review are
exceedingly rare. 75
Excepting the rare case where an accused magnanimously waives
his appellate rights, the convening authority, upon approving a sentence
including a punitive discharge or confinement for one year or longer,
sends the record of trial to the appropriate service Judge Advocate
General. 76 The Judge Advocate General then forwards the record to the
Court of Criminal Appeals for the first level of appellate review under
Article 66 of the UCMJ. 77 Each service is required under the UCMJ to
appoint appellate defense counsel to represent accuseds, at government
expense, in their appeals to the applicable Court of Criminal Appeals. 78
Thus, in every case involving Article 66 appellate review, a
government-funded appellate defense counsel reviews the record of trial
in order to determine what errors, if any, can be asserted in the Court of
Criminal Appeals. 79 In performing that task, “[a]ppellate defense
counsel has the obligation to assign all arguable issues,” as well as to
identify issues that the accused asks counsel to raise even if counsel
believes that the issues raised by the accused are frivolous. 80 If appellate
defense counsel identifies issues worthy of an assignment of error, or if
the accused raises assignments of error that appellate defense counsel
believes are frivolous, appellate defense counsel files a brief before the
proper Court of Criminal Appeals, and appellate government counsel is
73. R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B).
74. R.C.M. 1109(c).
75. See Baker, 28 M.J. at 122.
76. R.C.M. 1111(a)(1), (b)(1) (requiring that general court-martial records of trial and special
court-martial records of trial be forwarded to the Judge Advocate General provided that the accused
has not waived appellate review).
77. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(b), art. 66(b) (2006) (requiring the service Judge Advocates
General to forward to a Court of Criminal Appeals all records of trial where the approved sentence
includes death, a punitive discharge, or confinement for one year); R.C.M. 1201(a) (same).
78. Id. § 870(a), (c), art. 70(a), (c) (2006); R.C.M. 1202(a), (b)(2).
79. See id.
80. United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431, 435-36 (C.M.A. 1982).
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assigned to review the brief and record of trial in order to formulate the
government’s response. 81
Moreover, even where the accused and his appellate defense
counsel submit no allegations of error, the Courts of Criminal Appeals
still must review the entire record of trial independently in order to
satisfy itself that the findings and sentence are correct as a matter of law
and fact. 82 When appellate defense counsel and the accused identify no
issues to raise on appeal, rather than having the case end there, appellate
defense counsel submits the record of trial to the Court of Criminal
Appeals “on the merits.” 83 A submission on the merits is a pleading
filed “without conceding the legal or factual correctness of the findings
of guilty or the sentence . . . [but] which does not assign error.” 84 As the
United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals explains in its rules:
In cases referred to the Court for review pursuant to Article 66,
U.C.M.J., the appellant, without conceding the legal or factual
correctness of the findings of guilty or the sentence, may file a
pleading which does not assign error, does not raise error asserted
personally by the appellant, and does not request specific relief. In
such cases, the Clerk will deliver the original record of trial to the
Court without delay. The Court may proceed with its review and may
issue a decision unless notified within seven days that the appellee
85
intends to file a brief . . . .

81. Id.; see also § 870(b), art. 70(b) (detailing duties of appellate government counsel);
United States v. McNally, No. ACM 28963, 1991 WL 82142, at *1 (A.F.C.M.R. Mar. 14, 1991)
(noting that appellate government counsel typically is not provided a record of trial for review until
such time as error has been assigned).
82. § 866(c), art. 66(c); see also Grostefon, 12 M.J. at 435 (observing that the service Courts
of Criminal Appeals, then known as the Courts of Military Review, have “the mandatory
responsibility to read the entire record and independently arrive at a decision that the findings and
sentence are correct in law and fact”). Indeed, the Courts of Criminal Appeals are unique among
appellate courts in that they have de novo fact finding powers. § 866(c), art. 66(c) (“In considering
the record, [the Court of Criminal Appeals] may weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of
witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact, recognizing that the trial court saw and
heard the witnesses.”); United States v. Tyler, 34 M.J. 293, 295 (C.M.A. 1992) (commenting on the
“unique fact finding power(s)” of the Courts of Criminal Appeals).
83. See United States v. Pritchett, No. NMCCA 9601212, 2005 WL 1656838, at *2 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. July 14, 2005) (“[E]ach lawyer who enters an appearance has a duty to read the record
and file a brief or submission on the merits in a timely manner.”).
84. United States v. Adams, 59 M.J. 367, 369 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (omission in original); see also
United States v. Riggs, 59 M.J. 614, 615 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2003) (characterizing a merits
submission as a pleading that “while not acknowledging that the findings and sentence are correct in
law and fact, has assigned no error”).
85. A. CT. CRIM. APP. R.15.2, available at http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/acca. The Air Force
and Navy-Marine Corps Courts of Criminal Appeals similarly have internal rules acknowledging
the existence of briefs “on the merits,” where the accused and his appellate defense counsel assign
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A submission “on the merits” therefore simply sends the record of
trial to the Court of Criminal Appeals and requires that court to review
the entire record in order to render its independent judgment as to
whether there are any errors that could affect the legal and factual
correctness of the approved findings and sentence, even where the
accused and his appellate counsel have alleged no errors. 86 In
conducting this independent review of submissions “on the merits,” the
Courts of Criminal Appeals can take any number of actions, from
approving the court-martial findings and sentence, to taking corrective
action with respect to errors that it identifies, to addressing potential
legal issues and explaining why they require no corrective action, to
specifying issues to be briefed by appellate defense counsel and
appellate government counsel for further consideration by the court. 87
Once the Court of Criminal Appeals has issued its decision, an
accused, through his assigned appellate defense counsel, can file a
petition in the CAAF, asking that court to review the decision of the
Court of Criminal Appeals. 88 In cases in which CAAF grants review,
the accused can file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court to the extent that the accused is aggrieved by the
CAAF’s decision. 89 As with petitions for review filed with CAAF, an
no errors to the proceedings below and the court proceeds with its independent review of the record.
See A.F. CT. CRIM. APP. R.15.4, available at https://afcca.law.af.mil/content/afcca_data
/cp/afccacombinedrules-05mar07.pdf (“Cases in which appellate defense counsel do not assign and
the Court does not specify any issues, will be designated ‘merits’ cases. Appellate government
counsel need not respond to a case submitted on its merits.”); N-M. Ct. Crim. App. R.4-1(b),
available at http://www/jag.navy.mil/documents/NMCCARules RulesPandP.doc (adopting different
filing procedures for appellate briefs assigning error and “merit submissions”).
86. See Adams, 59 M.J. at 369.
87. For a sampling of cases in which a Court of Criminal Appeals raised an issue on an appeal
submitted “on the merits,” see, e.g., United States v. Peele, 46 M.J. 866, 867 n.1 (A. Ct. Crim. App.
1997); United States v. Reynolds, 44 M.J. 726, 727 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1996); United States v.
Smith, 41 M.J. 817, 818 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1995); United States v. Sanchez, 40 M.J. 508, 509
(A.C.M.R. 1994); United States v. Vandivel, 37 M.J. 854, 856 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993); United States v.
Simms, 35 M.J. 902, 903 (A.C.M.R. 1992); United States v. Wallace, 35 M.J. 897, 898 (A.C.M.R.
1992); United States v. Washington, 35 M.J. 774, 775 (A.C.M.R. 1992); United States v. Story, 35
M.J. 677, 677 (A.C.M.R. 1992); United States v. Bouknight, 35 M.J. 671, 672 (A.C.M.R. 1992);
United States v. Coleman, 34 M.J. 1020, 1021 (A.C.M.R. 1992); United States v. Gowadia, 34 M.J.
714, 716 (A.C.M.R. 1992); United States v. Simpson, 33 M.J. 1063, 1064 (A.C.M.R. 1991); United
States v. Goodes, 33 M.J. 888, 888 (C.G.C.M.R. 1991); United States v. Brookins, 33 M.J. 793, 794
(A.C.M.R. 1991); United States v. Tenk, 33 M.J. 765, 766 (A.C.M.R. 1991); United States v.
McCaig, 32 M.J. 751, 752 (A.C.M.R. 1991); United States v. Morales-Santana, 32 M.J. 557, 557
(A.C.M.R. 1990); United States v. Shaw, 30 M.J. 1033, 1033 (A.F.C.M.R. 1990).
88. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 867(b), art. 67(b) (2006) (conferring upon the CAAF discretionary
jurisdiction over decisions by the Courts of Criminal Appeals); § 870(c), art. 70(c) (providing that
appellate defense counsel shall represent an accused before the CAAF upon the accused’s request).
89. Id. § 867a(a), art. 67a(a) (2006).
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accused is entitled to representation by a government-funded appellate
defense counsel in connection with the filing of a petition for a writ of
certiorari. 90 These are the “costs” that the UCMJ and Rules for CourtsMartial impose on the military appellate review system for each of the
thousands of courts-martial each year that result in an approved sentence
that includes a punitive discharge or confinement for one year or more.
It must be stressed, however, that the use of the term “costs” to
describe the required appellate review procedures is not intended in a
pejorative sense. The fact that the appellate review process for a given
court-martial imposes a cost or burden does not necessarily mean that
these costs are wasteful or unwise. When an accused is charged with a
crime and contests guilt at trial, it makes perfect sense to establish
procedures that allow the accused meaningfully to challenge his
conviction on appeal. And the unique characteristics of the court-martial
forum, with its emphasis on speed and the worldwide reach of its
jurisdiction, certainly supports the notion that the government should
bear the financial burden of ensuring that the accused is adequately
represented on appeal. 91
But every case is not A Few Good Men or The Caine Mutiny, where
the accused vigorously contests the charges against him and rightfully
should expect an appellate review apparatus that will allow him to
pursue vindication on appeal. Rather, many courts-martial, if not most,
involve no contested charges, have an accused who has agreed to plead
guilty to some or all of the charges in return for sentencing relief, have
no pretrial motions filed or ruled upon, and, in many cases, involve a
situation where the accused has expressly asked the military judge to
sentence him to a punitive discharge from the service. 92 The military
justice system’s one-size-fits-all appellate review system, which requires
the same procedural steps for an essentially uncontested guilty plea case
as it does for a full-blown trial on the merits, does a disservice to the
accused who actually litigated issues below because it diverts resources
to guilty plea cases with no contested issues that could be expended in
dealing with appeals from contested courts-martial. 93 At a bare
90. Id. § 870, art. 70. Indeed, the CAAF recently issued an order directing an accused’s
appellate defense counsel to continue representation of the accused where the deadline for filing a
certiorari petition had not expired. Order, Lovett v. United States, No. 07-8002/AF, Daily Journal
No. 07-015 (Oct. 24, 2006), available at http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/journal/
2006Jrnl/2006Oct.htm.
91. See Smith, supra note 2, at 674 (“One of the advantages of the military justice system is
its ability to respond quickly to acts of misconduct.”).
92. See infra Part III.D.
93. Id.
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minimum, the seeming illogic in treating contested courts-martial the
same as uncontested guilty plea cases for appellate review purposes
justifies an examination of the credits and debits of continuing fullblown appellate review of virtually all courts-martial reaching the
punishment threshold set forth in Article 66(b) of the UCMJ. 94
III. THE CASE FOR ENDING REGULARIZED APPELLATE REVIEW OF
GUILTY PLEA CASES
A. Comparing Civilian and Military Practice
The military justice system, as presently constructed, essentially
requires the same appellate review for each and every court-martial
where the approved sentence includes a punitive discharge or
confinement for one year or more. 95 Indeed, the only cases meeting the
Article 66(b) punishment threshold that are not subject to full-blown
appellate review are cases in which the accused takes the affirmative
step (for no consideration) of waiving or withdrawing appellate
review. 96 The extent of appellate review does not depend on whether
the accused pleaded guilty at trial, whether he had a pretrial agreement
to plead guilty, or even whether the accused raised a single motion or
objection at trial. 97 In conducting a ground-up assessment of the utility
of that program, a useful starting point is consideration of the appellate
review process in the civilian federal court system.
One reason why a review of civilian practice is a sensible starting
point is Article 36(a) of the UCMJ, which permits the President to
promulgate court-martial rules subject to the following guidance:
Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures . . . may be prescribed by the
President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable,
apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district
courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this
chapter. 98

While Article 36(a) appears to evince a legislative preference that
court-martial procedures conform to civilian practice where practicable,

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(b), art. 66(b) (2006).
Id. § 866(b), art. 66(b).
Id.
See id.
Id. § 836(a), art. 36(a).
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this is hardly an inexorable command. 99 In enacting the UCMJ,
Congress expressly created an appellate review system where the
standards for appellate review would differ from the standards in federal
court. 100 Therefore, one properly can surmise that, at least as of the time
of the enactment of the UCMJ, Congress itself had concluded that
appellate review norms for courts-martial and for civilian courts need
not be congruent. Moreover, even where the UCMJ is silent on an issue
of procedure, its only command is that the President apply federal court
principles only so far as he determines that such principles are
practicable for court-martial practice. 101
Nevertheless, consideration of civilian practice is a crucial starting
point in assessing existing court-martial appellate procedures because
civilian practice sheds considerable light on the value judgments
American society has made as to the appropriate appellate structure for a
respectable criminal justice system. Given society’s policy choices with
respect to the civilian criminal justice system, it is appropriate to
question why additional appellate review standards are required in the
military justice system than are deemed essential in the civilian context.
Of course, the fact that the military justice system might have additional
procedures in one aspect or another of appellate review does not per se
make those procedures inappropriate or excessive, but it does signal an
appropriate place to stop and at least consider whether the advantages of
those additional procedures justify the costs that they impose on the
system.
There are four distinctions between the military and federal court
criminal justice systems that, when applied together, create a remarkable
difference in the appellate review procedures in each forum. 102 The first
such distinction is that the military justice system creates mandatory
appellate review when the approved sentence reaches a relatively low
threshold, 103 while there is no mandatory appellate review in the federal
court system. Rather, in federal court, a criminal defendant can appeal
his conviction and sentence only if he takes the affirmative step of
99. See id.
100. Compare U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(b), art. 66(b) (2006) (requiring, except where the
accused waived appellate review, referral to a Court of Criminal Appeals of all courts-martial where
the adjudged sentence includes a punitive discharge or confinement for one year) and § 866(c), art.
66(c) (requiring a Court of Criminal Appeals to review the record of trial of every court-martial
referred to it) with FED. R. APP. P. 3(A) (providing that an appeal of right is taken only by filing a
notice of appeal in the federal district court within the time required).
101. Id. § 836(a), art. 36(a).
102. See infra notes 103-125 and accompanying text.
103. § 866(b), art. 66(b).
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timely filing a notice of appeal. 104 Thus, in civilian practice, inertia
leads to no appeal, while in the military justice system, inertia leads to
automatic appellate review.
The second distinction between the two systems of justice concerns
the accused’s ability to waive appellate review of his case. In federal
civilian practice, an accused is permitted to waive appellate review as
part of his plea bargain with the government, and therefore can use his
appellate rights as a bargaining chip in plea discussions. 105 By contrast,
while a military accused, except one facing an approved death sentence,
has the power to waive appellate review, the court-martial rules
promulgated by the President prohibit the accused from trading away his
appellate rights as part of plea negotiations 106 and prohibit the
government from offering the accused any inducement at all, such as

104. See FED. R. APP. P. 3 (requiring the timely filing of a notice of appeal to create appellate
court jurisdiction).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Speaks, No. 05-4091, 2006 WL 3827002, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec.
28, 2006) (“In paragraph 5 of his plea agreement, Speaks waived his right to appeal ‘the conviction
and whatever sentence is imposed.’ A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that waiver is
knowing and intelligent.”); United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Since
Wiggins, [905 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1990)], we have consistently adhered to the principle that
sentencing appeal waivers generally are enforceable and we have enforced such waivers in a
number of cases.”); United States v. Cohen, 459 F.3d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Generally
speaking, we will uphold a defendant’s waiver of appellate rights if the waiver is valid and the issue
sought to be appealed falls within the scope of the waiver.”); United States v. Hernandez, 170 F.
App’x 606, 607 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Hernandez’s sentence appeal waiver is valid and enforceable,
and it precludes from appellate review any potential sentencing issues . . . .”); United States v.
Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1318 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“[W]e generally enforce plea agreements
and their concomitant waivers of appellate rights.”); United States v. Joseph, 38 F. App’x 985, 986
(4th Cir. 2002) (“A waiver of appeal provision in a valid plea agreement is enforceable if it resulted
from a knowing and intelligent decision to forgo an appeal.”); United States v. Anderson, 28 F.
App’x 795, 797 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The United States correctly argues that defendant waived his
statutory right to appeal by knowingly and voluntarily waiving that right in his plea agreement.”);
United States v. Gamboa-Felix, 18 F. App’x 204, 208 (4th Cir. 2001) (“We have consistently held
that, with a few exceptions, a defendant may not appeal his sentence if his plea agreement contains
an express and unqualified waiver of the right to appeal, unless that waiver was unknowing or
involuntary.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110,
113 (2d Cir. 2001) (“It is by now well established that a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right
to appeal is generally enforceable.”); United States v. Aponte-Rodriguez, 7 F. App’x 715, 715 (9th
Cir. 2001) (“There is no dispute that Aponte-Rodriguez agreed to waive appellate review in
exchange for a reduced sentence. Such waivers are effective even when the defendant seeks to
appeal a sentence imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines . . . .”
(citations and internal quotations omitted) (omission in original)); United States v. Buchanan, 59
F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A defendant may waive the statutory right to appeal his sentence. . .
. We look to circumstances surrounding the signing and entry of the plea agreement to determine
whether the defendant agreed to its terms knowingly and voluntarily.” (citations omitted)).
106. See R.C.M. 705(c) (“A term or condition in a pretrial agreement shall not be enforced if it
deprives the accused of . . . the complete and effective exercise of post-trial and appellate rights.”).
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sentencing relief, in return for a waiver of appellate review. 107 As a
result of these different rules, military accuseds almost never waive their
appellate rights while civilian accuseds frequently bargain those rights
away in plea negotiations. 108 Indeed, appellate review waivers are so
ingrained into civilian practice that the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure specifically provide that, as part of its plea colloquy, the
district court “must inform the defendant of, and determine that the
defendant understands . . . the terms of any plea-agreement provision
waiving the right to appeal.” 109
A third important difference between the federal criminal justice
system and the military justice system is that even when civilian
criminal defendants do not expressly waive appellate review as part of a
plea agreement, they generally forfeit the right to challenge a finding of
guilt on appeal by pleading guilty to the charge in federal district
court. 110 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) limits the federal
court of appeals’ review of trial court errors not raised below to “plain
errors or errors affecting substantial rights.” 111 In explaining how the
rule serves to limit a criminal defendant’s power to raise issues on
appeal that were not raised at trial, the Supreme Court made the almosttoo-obvious point that a defendant may not plead guilty at trial and then
challenge the fact that he was convicted of the offense on appeal:
The first limitation on appellate authority under Rule 52(b) is that there
indeed be an “error.” Deviation from a legal rule is “error” unless the
rule has been waived. For example, a defendant who knowingly and
voluntarily pleads guilty in conformity with the requirements of Rule
11 cannot have his conviction vacated by court of appeals on the
grounds that he ought to have had a trial. Because the right to trial is
waivable, and because the defendant who enters a valid guilty plea
waives that right, his conviction without trial is not “error.” 112

107. See R.C.M. 1110(c) (“No person may compel, coerce, or induce an accused by force,
promises of clemency, or otherwise to waive or withdraw appellate review.”).
108. See supra note 105 (collecting representative federal court cases in which the defendant
waived his appellate rights as part of the plea-bargaining process).
109. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N).
110. See Fed. R. Crim P. 52(b).
111. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
112. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1993). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11 sets forth the inquiry required of a federal district judge in order to ensure that the defendant is
pleading guilty to an offense knowingly and voluntarily. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. See also Kercheval v.
United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927) (“A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere
admission or an extrajudicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is
conclusive. More is not required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence.”).
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Thus, a plea of guilty “is more than an admission of past conduct; it
is the defendant’s consent that judgment of conviction may be entered
without a trial – a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or a judge.” 113
As a result, under the federal criminal system, a defendant who
knowingly and voluntarily pleads guilty waives his right to challenge his
conviction on appeal. 114
By contrast, the military accused who pleads guilty – even if he
pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement – does not waive the right to
challenge his conviction on appeal, and he need not even thread the
needle of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in order to seek
reversal of his conviction on appeal. 115 Under the military justice
system, a military judge considering an accused’s guilty plea must not
only ensure that the accused’s plea is knowing and voluntary, but also
must engage in a colloquy with the accused – called a providence
inquiry – in which the accused admits the facts that cause him to believe

113. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 242 (1969) (“A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did
various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine
punishment.”).
114. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733; see also, e.g., Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.2 (1975)
(“[A] counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and
intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case . . . .”); United States v.
Castillo, 464 F.3d 988, 990 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Vasquez, 29 F. App’x 876, 877 (3d Cir.
2002) (“As a general rule, an entry of a plea of guilty waives appellate review unless the court
lacked jurisdiction, the plea was invalid, or the sentence was illegal.”). While a civilian convicted
pursuant to a guilty plea can maintain a habeas corpus petition alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel, the standard is exceedingly high. “A guilty plea, voluntarily and intelligently entered, may
not be vacated because the defendant was not advised of every conceivable constitutional plea in
abatement he might have to the charge, no matter how peripheral such a plea might be to the normal
focus of counsel’s inquiry.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). Rather, a habeas
petitioner who pleaded guilty at trial “may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the
guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards [of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.]” Id. (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). In pursuing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a habeas petitioner
who pleaded guilty must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Such a habeas petitioner is further burdened by the fact that his plea of guilty
waives his right to assert “independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that
occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267; see also New York v. Hill,
528 U.S. 110, 117 (2000) (“We allow waiver of numerous constitutional protections for criminal
defendants that also serve broader social interests.”); United States v. Mezzanotto, 513 U.S. 196,
201 (1995) (“A criminal defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most
fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution.”) (collecting cases); Peretz v. United States,
501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) (“The most basic rights of criminal defendants are similarly subject to
waiver.”).
115. See R.C.M. 910(e).
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he is guilty of the offense charged. 116 The CAAF has explained the
difference between civilian and military plea inquiries as follows:
The record of trial when a guilty plea is entered in a court-martial
generally is more detailed than the record made in a similar proceeding
in federal civilian criminal court. When an accused proffers a guilty
plea in a court-martial, the military judge is bound to establish on the
record that there is a factual basis for the plea. [T]he accuse[d] must
be convinced of, and be able to describe all the facts necessary to
establish guilt. Indeed, at any time prior to sentencing, if an accused
makes a statement to the court-martial, in testimony or otherwise, or
presents evidence which is inconsistent with a plea of guilty on which
a finding is based, the military judge shall inquire into the providence
of the plea. If the military judge is unable to resolve this apparent
inconsistency, he is obliged as a matter of law to set aside the guilty
117
plea and enter a plea of not guilty.

The requirement of a providence inquiry stands in stark contrast to
civilian criminal practice, which requires no such inquiry 118 and which
also permits a civilian criminal defendant to enter an Alford plea, in
which the defendant pleads guilty without even admitting his guilt. 119
The requirement of a providence inquiry under the military justice
system has significant implications for the court-martial appellate
system. While the federal system treats a guilty plea as waiving the

116. R.C.M. 910(e) (“The military judge shall not accept a plea of guilty without making such
inquiry of the accused as shall satisfy the military judge that there is a factual basis for the plea. The
accused shall be questioned under oath about the offenses.”).
117. United States v. Lloyd, 46 M.J. 19, 23 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (internal quotations and citations
omitted) (alteration in original).
118. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (setting forth required inquiry before a federal district judge may
accept a guilty plea).
119. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (“An individual accused of crime
may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence
even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.”).
Indeed, Robinson O. Everett explained this significant difference between military and civilian
practice in an article he wrote while serving as Chief Judge of the United States Court of Military
Appeals:
Article 45 of the Uniform Code provides that if, after a plea of guilty, the accused sets up
matter inconsistent with his plea, then a plea of not guilty will be entered. In a number
of cases that over the years reached our Court the issue was whether an accused’s
testimony or other evidence in mitigation and extenuation was inconsistent with his plea.
In the civil courts, it seems well-established that a guilty plea will be deemed voluntary
and not improvident even though the defendant testifies during his trial that he was
innocent of the offense to which he pleads guilty.
Robinson O. Everett, Some Comments on the Civilianization of Military Justice, ARMY LAW., Sept.
1980, at 1, 4.
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defendant’s right to challenge his conviction on appeal, 120 this is not the
case in the military justice system. The military appellate courts have
long allowed accuseds who pleaded guilty at trial to argue on appeal that
their conviction should be overturned because they did not admit facts in
their providence inquiry to satisfy all of the elements of the offense, or
because evidence adduced at some point in the court-martial was
inconsistent with the accused’s plea of guilty. 121 While the standard for
overturning a conviction based on an inadequate providence inquiry is
relatively high – requiring “a substantial conflict between the plea and
the accused’s statements or other evidence on the record” 122 – appellate
challenges to the providence of a guilty plea are common in the military
justice system and tax the resources of the military appellate courts and
appellate counsel in briefing and resolving such challenges. 123
Finally, not only does the military justice system create a
mandatory appeal of courts-martial surpassing a relatively low
sentencing threshold, but the military appellate courts are also required
to conduct independent review of the record of trial to determine
120. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
121. See United States v. Prater, 32 M.J. 433, 436 (C.M.A. 1991) (discussing availability of
appellate challenge to sufficiency of the providence inquiry conducted at trial).
122. United States v. Garcia, 44 M.J. 496, 498 (C.A.A.F. 1996). “A ‘mere possibility’ of such
a conflict is not a sufficient basis to overturn the trial results.” Id. (quoting Prater, 32 M.J. at 436).
123. For example, a cursory search of the military justice database on Westlaw for decisions
between June and December 2006, reveals a multitude of military appellate decisions in which the
principal issue resolved in the appeal was whether the providence inquiry provided a sufficient basis
for the military judge to accept the accused’s guilty plea, or whether evidence presented by the
accused was sufficiently inconsistent with the accused’s plea to have required rejection of the plea.
See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 63 M.J. 223, 225 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Zachary, 63
M.J. 438, 444 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Phillippe, 63 M.J. 307, 310 (C.A.A.F. 2006);
United States v. Flores, No. ACM 36218, 2006 WL 3895072, at *2 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 15,
2006); United States v. Lazard, No. ACM 36430, 2006 WL 3085630, at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
Oct. 18, 2006); United States v. Chaney, No. ACM 36138, 2006 WL 2843492, at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. Sept. 29, 2006); United States v. Firth, 64 M.J. 508, 510 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2006); United
States v. Wallace, No. ACM 36407, 2006 WL 2548174, at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2006);
United States v. Lewis, No. ACM 36401, 2006 WL 2547404, at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 25,
2006); United States v. Stordahl, No. ACM 36187, 2006 WL 2547873, at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
Aug. 22, 2006); United States v. Smith, No. ACM S30806, 2006 WL 2269035, at *1 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. July 20, 2006); United States v. Trott, No. ACM 36077, 2006 WL 2269417, at *3 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. July 18, 2006); United States v. McLaurin, No. ACMS 30371, 2006 WL 1976550, at
*2 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 30, 2006). These electronically-available decisions do not include the
slip opinions rejecting providence inquiry challenges that are not selected for inclusion in the
Westlaw database. In addition, the Courts of Criminal Appeals, in completing their mandatory
Article 66(c) review of courts-martial, are required to consider the sufficiency of the accused’s
providence inquiry even when the accused and his appellate defense counsel have not even asserted
that the providence inquiry was inadequate. United States v. Lloyd, 46 M.J. 19, 23 (C.A.A.F. 1997)
(“The Courts of Criminal Appeals must also consider the providence inquiry to ensure that findings
are correct in law and fact under Article 66(c).”).
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whether any issues should be addressed that were not even raised by the
accused and his appellate defense counsel. 124 By contrast, the federal
courts of appeals are not required to consider appellate issues not raised
by the parties, and regularly hold that a defendant has forfeited a claim
of error by not raising it in his papers. 125
As the foregoing discussions demonstrates, virtually every
convention in the civilian criminal justice system is designed to end the
fight over the defendant’s guilt once he has pleaded guilty and had a
judgment of conviction entered by the federal district court. 126 These
conventions begin by requiring that an accused timely file a notice of
appeal, and then discourage appellate litigation of guilt issues by
liberally allowing plea agreements to provide for a waiver of appellate
review, by providing that a guilty plea waives appeal of the conviction
itself even where there has been no explicit waiver agreement, and by
limiting appellate review to those issues actually raised by the
defendant. 127 The military justice system could not be more different, in
that it: (1) provides for mandatory review of the findings of guilt in
thousands of guilty plea cases each year; (2) prohibits waiver of
appellate review as part of the plea bargaining process; (3) encourages
appellate challenges to convictions in guilty plea cases by providing
appellate defense counsel to pursue such challenges; and (4) requires an
appellate court to independently determine that the record of trial
supports a finding of guilt, even when the accused himself has made no
124. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 469 F.3d 568, 569-70 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The government
is correct that an issue is deemed forfeited on appeal if it is merely mentioned and not developed.”);
United States v. Alarid, 204 F. App’x 589, 590 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[I]ssues which are not
specifically and distinctly argued and raised in a party’s opening brief are waived.”) (quoting Arpin
v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001)); United States v. Nealy,
232 F.3d 825, 830 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Thus, Defendant abandoned the indictment issue by not
raising it in his initial brief.”); United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1064 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) (The
“failure to raise a theory as an issue on appeal constitutes a waiver because consideration of that
theory would vitiate the requirement of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and our own local
rules that, absent extraordinary circumstances, briefs must contain statements of issues presented for
appeal . . . .” (quoting Int’l Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 978 F.2d 1318 1327 n.11 (3d
Cir. 1992))); United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[A]n argument not made in
the opening brief is waived.”); United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1318 n.12 (1st Cir. 1994)
(“As this court has consistently held, issues raised for the first time in appellant’s reply brief are
generally deemed waived.”); United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (referencing
the “settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some
effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.”); United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315,
1332 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Having failed to raise this issue in their briefs or at oral argument, the
appellants abandoned this ground of appeal.”).
126. See supra notes 102-125.
127. See id.
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such challenge on appeal. 128 If we accept that the civilian criminal
justice system reflects society’s conclusion that a baseline, respectable
criminal justice system generally need not permit defendants who plead
guilty to take the fight over the conviction itself to the appellate courts, it
is a fair question whether it makes any sense to regularly impose these
burdens on the military justice system. As the following discussion will
explain, it is this author’s view that there is no good reason to perpetuate
this anachronistic aspect of the military justice system.
B. Mandatory Appellate Review Disserves the Policies Underlying the
Military Justice System
The problem with the military appellate system is not merely that it
is different from its civilian counterpart; rather, the problem is that the
military appellate structure – with its mandatory review of all courtsmartial reaching a relatively low punishment threshold – runs directly
counter to the policies underlying every other aspect of the military
justice system. While the rest of the military justice system reflects the
military’s greater need for finality and expedition, the extraordinary
scope of appellate review runs against the grain to provide less finality
and less certainty for courts-martial as compared to civilian
proceedings. 129 It makes little sense to construct a court-martial system
that furthers the military’s interest in discipline, finality, and speed, and
then to layer that system with an appellate review structure that
undermines all of those interests.
The Supreme Court “has recognized that the military is, by
necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society.” 130 The
specialized and separate nature of the military community flows from
the military’s constitutional duty “to fight or be ready to fight should the
occasion arise.” 131 In order to adequately perform “its mission, the
military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit
de corps.” 132 And, unlike society at large, “[t]he military need not
encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent that such tolerance is
required of the civilian state. . . .” 133 Rather, “[t]he rights of military
128. See id.
129. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 38 (1976) (noting “the difference between the
diverse civilian community and the much more tightly regimented military community”).
130. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974); see also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354
(1980).
131. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).
132. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986).
133. Id.
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men must yield somewhat to meet certain overriding demands of
discipline and duty.” 134 As the Court has explained:
To prepare for and perform its vital role, the military must insist upon
a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life.
The laws and traditions governing that discipline have a long history;
but they are founded on unique military exigencies as powerful now as
in the past. 135

Where the law and the military intersect, the military’s enhanced
needs for obedience, finality, and speed are pervasive influences in
ordering the rights of servicemembers as against the United States
government. Perhaps most prominently, the Court has adopted the
“military deference doctrine,” a jurisprudential construct by which the
Court is far more deferential to the political branches when considering
certain constitutional challenges to military regulations than the Court is
when considering constitutional challenges in the civilian context. 136 As
an example, in Parker v. Levy, 137 the Court rejected First Amendment
and due process “void-for-vagueness” challenges to UCMJ provisions
criminalizing “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman” and
“disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in
the armed forces.” 138 The Court’s analysis began with a consideration of
the different government interests involved in “military” and “civilian”
regulation:
While the members of the military are not excluded from the
protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of
the military community and of the military mission requires a different
application of those protections. The fundamental necessity for
obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline,
134. Brown, 444 U.S. at 354.
135. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975); see also Brown, 444 U.S. at 357
(1980) (“Because the right to command and the duty to obey ordinarily must go unquestioned, this
Court long ago recognized that the military must possess substantial discretion over its internal
discipline.”); Levy, 417 U.S. at 743 (“An army is not a deliberative body. It is the executive arm.
Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left open as to the right to command in the officer,
or the duty of obedience in the soldier.” (quoting United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153
(1890))).
136. For a more comprehensive analysis of the military deference doctrine, see John F.
O’Connor, The Origins and Application of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV.161,
214-306 (2000).
137. Levy, 417 U.S. at 733..
138. Id. at 738. “[C]onduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman” is criminalized by Article
133 of the UCMJ. See U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 933, art. 133 (2006). “[D]isorders and neglects to the
prejudice of good order and discipline” are criminalized by Article 134 of the UCMJ. See id. § 934,
art. 134.
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may render permissible within the military that which would be
constitutionally impermissible outside it. 139

Having made these observations, the Levy Court held that “[f]or the
reasons which differentiate military society from civilian society, we
think Congress is permitted to legislate both with greater breadth and
with greater flexibility when prescribing the rules by which the former
shall be governed than it is when prescribing rules for the latter.” 140
Therefore, the military’s heightened need for obedience and discipline
allowed criminal statutes to withstand constitutional challenge when
similar statutes might not pass constitutional muster in the civilian
context. 141
Similarly, in holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel
for servicemembers subjected to trial by summary court-martial, 142 the
Court concluded in Middendorf v. Henry 143 that “presence of counsel
will turn a brief, informal hearing which may be quickly convened and
rapidly concluded into an attenuated proceeding which consumes the
resources of the military to a degree which Congress could properly
have felt to be beyond what is warranted by the relative insignificance of
the offenses being tried.” 144 Recognizing the special needs of the
military, the Court further concluded that “[s]uch a lengthy proceeding is
a particular burden to the Armed Forces because virtually all the
participants, including the defendant and his counsel, are members of the
military whose time may be better spent than in possibly protracted
disputes over the imposition of discipline.” 145 Indeed, over the past
thirty-five years, the Court repeatedly, and consistently, has invoked the
military deference doctrine to defeat due process, 146 equal protection, 147

139. Levy, 417 U.S. at 758.
140. Id. at 756.
141. Id.
142. A summary court-martial is a court-martial presided over by a military officer appointed
by the commander who convened the court. That officer acts as “judge, factfinder, prosecutor, and
defense counsel.” Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 32 (1976). The maximum sentence that can
be imposed at a summary court-martial is confinement for one month, forty-five days’ hard labor
without confinement, two months’ restriction, reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade, and
forfeiture of two-thirds pay for one month. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 820, art. 20 (2006).
143. Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 25.
144. Id. at 45.
145. Id. at 45-46; see also Levy, 417 U.S. at 743 (“The differences between the military and
civilian communities result from the fact that ‘it is the primary business of armies and navies to
fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.’” (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955))).
146. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (“Neither Mathews nor Medina,
however, arose in the military context, and we have recognized in past cases that the tests and
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and First Amendment 148 challenges to court-martial procedures or other
federal regulations governing military affairs, where the same
procedures and regulations would be constitutionally suspect in the
civilian context.
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court has fastened onto the peculiar
needs of the military in erecting judge-made barriers to litigation by
servicemembers against their military leadership. 149 In a series of cases
beginning in 1950, the Court created a judge-made exception to the
United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 150 holding that Congress did not intend to permit suits by
servicemembers or their survivors against the United States for injuries
incident to military service. 151 Three decades later, the Supreme Court
applied similar reasoning to hold that servicemembers should not be
permitted to bring a Bivens action 152 alleging constitutional violations by
their military superiors. 153 After detailing the military’s need for
reflexive obedience to orders, and “the peculiar and special relationship
of the soldier to his superiors,” 154 the Court based its decision on its
judgment that the special needs of the military required two separate sets

limitations [of due process] may differ because of the military context.” (internal quotations
omitted) (alteration in original)); Middendorf, 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976).
147. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981) (“In [the area of military affairs], as any
other, Congress remains subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause, but the tests and
limitations to be applied may differ because of the military context.” (citation omitted). Rostker
involved a gender-based challenge to the Military Selective Service Act under the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 63.
148. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (“These aspects of military life do not,
of course, render entirely nugatory in the military context the guarantees of the First Amendment.
But within the military community there is simply not the same [individual] autonomy as there is in
the larger civilian community.” (quotations and internal citations omitted) (alteration in original));
Brown, 444 U.S. at 354; Greer, 424 U.S. at 838.
149. See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
151. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146; see also United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)
(rejecting Federal Tort Claims Act suits by survivors of servicemembers injured incident to their
military service); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 691 (1987) (holding that the Feres
doctrine barred a Federal Tort Claims Act suit even where the defendant was not the
servicemember’s military superior, but was a civilian government employee).
152. A “Bivens action” is a “suit for damages against federal officials whose actions violated
an individual’s constitutional rights.” Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983). Even though
Congress had not expressly authorized such suits, the Supreme Court allowed such suits to proceed
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 388-389
(1971).
153. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304; see also United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683-684
(1987) (rejecting Bivens actions by servicemembers for alleged constitutional violations relating to
their military service even where the defendant is a civilian government employee).
154. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300 (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)).
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of rules, one for the military and one for the civilian world: “The special
status of the military has required, the Constitution contemplated,
Congress has created and this Court has long recognized two systems of
justice, to some extent parallel: one for civilians and one for military
personnel.” 155 In all of these cases, the Court based its reasoning on the
military’s special relationship with servicemembers, as well as the
military’s need for instinctive obedience and its need to focus on
national defense rather than litigation.
Indeed, the military’s heightened interest in discipline, speed, and
finality of litigation pervades the court-martial system established by
Congress, as virtually every difference between civilian court practice
and court-martial practice can be chalked up either to furthering these
interests or as a nod to historical practice in the military. Most
obviously, the UCMJ allows for summary courts-martial, where an
accused may be sentenced to confinement for one month and forfeiture
of pay without having any right to representation by counsel. 156 In
upholding this practice against a due process challenge, the Supreme
Court observed in Middendorf v. Henry 157 that Congress’s refusal to
provide counsel for summary courts-martial reflected the military’s
interest in making summary courts-martial fast and informal so that the
participants are not unduly diverted from their ordinary military
duties. 158 With respect to special courts-martial and general courtsmartial, where the accused has a right to counsel and the proceedings
resemble civilian trials to a much greater degree, these same forces can
be seen in the structure of proceedings as provided by Congress and the
President.
Rule for Court-Martial 707 requires that an accused be arraigned
within one hundred twenty days of the earlier of the preferral of charges
or the imposition of pretrial restraint against the accused. 159 As the
drafters’ analysis to R.C.M. 707 explains, this requirement protects not
only an accused’s interest in a speedy trial, but also “protects the
command and societal interest in the prompt administration of
justice.” 160 When an accused is placed in pretrial arrest or confinement,
155. Id. at 303-04.
156. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 820, art. 20 (2006).
157. Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 25.
158. Id. at 45-46.
159. R.C.M. 707(a). R.C.M. 707 does permit the exclusion of certain periods of time from the
calculation of the 120-day deadline for arraigning an accused with approval of the appropriate
authority. R.C.M. 707(c).
160. R.C.M. 707, Analysis; see also R.C.M. 707(a), Discussion (“Offenses ordinarily should
be disposed of promptly to serve the interests of good order and discipline.”); United States v.
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Article 10 of the UCMJ requires the Government to take “immediate
steps” to bring the accused to trial, which can lead to a speedy trial
violation even where the Government has complied with the deadline for
arraignment imposed by R.C.M. 707. 161
Court-martial rules deviate from civilian practice in important ways
in order to effectuate this speedy disposition of charges. 162 The UCMJ
provides an accused with an absolute right to appointed military defense
counsel, without regard to financial need, for all general and special
By providing all court-martial accuseds with
courts-martial. 163
appointed defense counsel, the military is able to ensure that an accused
is represented by counsel at the earliest stages of the pretrial process,
which will allow the case to proceed to trial in a quicker and more
orderly fashion. 164 Moreover, court-martial practice allows the accused
to obtain much broader discovery from the government than defendants
typically are permitted in civilian proceedings. 165 As the CAAF has
explained, this broader discovery to the defense under military practice
“is designed to eliminate pretrial ‘gamesmanship,’ reduce the amount of
pretrial motions practice, and reduce the potential for ‘surprise and delay
at trial.’” 166
The actual trial of a court-martial is structured to further the
military’s interest in finality and speed. 167 Unlike civilian trials, there

Carlisle, 25 M.J. 426, 427 (C.M.A. 1988) (“[I]t is in the Government’s interest that there be speedy
disposition of charges.”).
161. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 810, art. 10; see United States v. Kossman, 38 M.J. 258, 261
(C.M.A. 1993) (noting that an accused could succeed on an Article 10 speedy trial motion even
where the Government has complied with the speedy trial provisions of R.C.M. 707).
162. See R.C.M. 707, Analysis.
163. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 827(b), art. 27(b) (2006) (requiring that military defense counsel
appointed to represent an accused at a general court-martial must be a judge advocate certified as
competent to serve as defense counsel by the service judge advocate general); R.C.M. 502(d)
(“Only persons certified under Article 27(b) as competent to perform duties as counsel in courtsmartial by the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which the counsel is a member may be
detailed as defense counsel or associate defense counsel in general or special courts-martial or as
trial counsel in general courts-martial.”)
164. See R.C.M. 707(a), Discussion (“Offenses ordinarily should be disposed of promptly to
serve the interests of good order and discipline.”).
165. United States v. Santos, 59 M.J. 317, 321 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (“The military justice system
provides for broader discovery than required by practice in federal civilian criminal trials.”); United
States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436, 439 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (“The military justice system has been a
leader with respect to open discovery and disclosure of exculpatory information to the defense.”);
R.C.M. 701, Analysis (“Military discovery practice has been quite liberal” with “broader discovery
than is required in Federal practice.”).
166. United States v. Jackson, 59 M.J. 330, 333-34 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (quoting R.C.M. 701,
Analysis).
167. See R.C.M. 707, Analysis.
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are no hung juries in courts-martial. Article 52 of the UCMJ ensures
that the court-martial members’ vote will result in a verdict. 168 If twothirds or more of the members vote to convict on a particular charge, the
accused is found guilty; if fewer than two-thirds vote to convict, the
accused is found not guilty. 169 Whether this departure from civilian
norms favors or harms an accused is debatable. On one hand, this
practice denies the accused the benefit of the “holdout juror,” as the
accused can be convicted on a divided vote. 170 On the other hand, if the
Government is unable to convince two-thirds of the members of the
accused’s guilt, it cannot pursue a retrial based on a hung jury. 171 What
this rule does clearly favor, however, is the virtue of finality, as a verdict
is going to be rendered at the court-martial regardless of whether the
members reach unanimity on all, or any, of the charges. 172
The service Courts of Criminal Appeals are similarly structured to
serve the interests of finality and expedition. The Courts of Criminal
Appeals are not bound by the trial court’s factual findings; rather, the
Courts of Criminal Appeals have the power to make their own factual
findings from the record of trial. 173
Moreover, in appropriate
circumstances, the Courts of Criminal Appeals have the power to make
their own factual findings from outside the record of trial by considering
affidavits on issues not raised or developed at trial, such as claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, unlawful command influence, or
claims of pretrial punishment. 174 This power allows the Courts of
Criminal Appeals to make factual findings and resolve factual issues, in
appropriate circumstances, without having to remand the case for
168. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(2), art. 52(a)(2) (2006). If death is a mandatory punishment
for an offense, the accused may be convicted only upon a unanimous vote of guilty by the members.
Id. § 852(a)(1), art. 52(a)(1).
169. Id. § 852(a)(2), art. 52(a)(2).
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. § 866(c), art. 66(c); United States v. Baker, 28 M.J. 121, 122 (C.M.A. 1989);
United States v. Crider, 46 C.M.R. 108, 111 (C.M.A. 1973) (noting that Article 66(c) allows the
Courts of Criminal Appeals to conduct a “de novo trial on the record at the appellate level”); see
also David D. Jividen, Will the Dike Burst? Plugging the Unconstitutional Hole in Article 66(c),
UCMJ, 38 A.F. L. REV. 63, 90 (1994) (analyzing service appellate courts’ use of their factfinding
powers on appeal); John Powers, Fact Finding in the Courts of Military Review, 44 BAYLOR L.
REV. 457, 465-68 (1992) (same); Martin D. Carpenter, Standards of Appellate Review and Article
66(c): A De Novo Review?, ARMY LAW., Oct. 1990, at 37 (describing the Courts of Criminal
Appeals as conducting a de novo review of the factual findings of courts-martial).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 43 M.J. 192, 194 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (approving of
service appellate court’s resolution of ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on affidavits
rather than remanding action for factfinding at the trial level).
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factfinding at the trial level. 175 The CAAF has described Congress’s
grant of factfinding powers in the Courts of Criminal Appeals as
“unparalleled among civilian tribunals.” 176
The Courts of Criminal Appeals’ factfinding powers also allow
them to avoid remand even where reversible error at trial requires that
the adjudged sentence be vacated. 177 When non-constitutional error at
trial has affected the adjudged sentence, the Court of Criminal Appeals
is not necessarily required to remand the case for a new sentencing
proceeding. 178 If the court can determine that, without the error, the
sentence would have been of a certain magnitude anyway, the Court of
Criminal Appeals can reassess the sentence itself and approve the
minimum sentence that the court determines would have been adjudged
in the absence of error. 179 If the error at trial was of constitutional
magnitude, the Court of Criminal Appeals still can reassess the sentence
rather than remanding the case if it is able to determine beyond a
reasonable doubt the minimum sentence that would have been adjudged
in the absence of the constitutional error. 180 As with their ordinary
factfinding powers, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ power to cure
defective sentencing proceedings by reassessing the sentence has the
benefit of reducing the circumstances in which the remand or retrial of a
court-martial is required.
Thus, the military justice system generally is constructed to further
the military’s interest in finality and efficient resolution of charges
against a servicemember. 181 The military’s interests in this regard do not
flow solely from some abstract concept of the military’s need for
unflinching obedience, though that certainly is part of the equation. 182
Trying a court-martial once is a burden on the military, as virtually all of
the key players, with the exception of any witnesses who might be
civilians, are military personnel diverted from other duties in order to

175. Id. (explaining the considerations that should inform the Courts of Criminal Appeals’
analysis of whether it can properly resolve a disputed issue through appellate factfinding as opposed
to a remand for factual development at the trial level). For a case in which the Court of Military
Appeals, the predecessor to the CAAF, held that the lower court erred in making appellate findings
of fact rather than remanding for an evidentiary hearing, see United States v. Dykes, 38 M.J. 270,
272 (C.M.A. 1993).
176. Baker, 28 M.J. at 122.
177. See United States v. Doss, 57 M.J. 182, 185 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
178. See id.
179. Id.; United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305, 307 (C.M.A. 1986).
180. Doss, 57 M.J. at 185.
181. R.C.M. 707, Analysis.
182. See supra notes 130-135 and accompanying text.
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participate in the court-martial. 183 As a practical matter, retrials and
remands are uniquely hard on the military, and the military justice
system seeks to limit these burdens by allowing for non-unanimous
verdicts, appellate factfinding, and sentencing reassessment on appeal. 184
The practical reasons why retrials and remands are particularly
burdensome in the military context are not difficult to fathom.
Courts-martial have worldwide jurisdiction. 185 That is, military
units conduct courts-martial wherever they are located, whether it is
courts-martial in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s, or in Afghanistan
or Iraq during this century. When a court-martial takes place in a
combat theater, it may be impossible to conduct a retrial if victims or
crucial witnesses are foreign nationals not under military control. The
problem is hardly any better when the court-martial takes place in the
United States. If a retrial is ordered a year or more after the original
trial, it is highly likely that it will be difficult to gather all of the crucial
witnesses even if they were military personnel. Military units regularly
deploy overseas, taking potential witnesses with them. The key witness
in last year’s court-martial may be guarding convoys in Iraq this year.
Moreover, a servicemember typically can expect to transfer duty stations
every few years, meaning that some percentage of trial witnesses will
likely be located far from the site of the court-martial a year after trial.
In addition to service-related transfers and deployments, servicemembers
regularly leave the service for civilian life, often returning to their
hometown or at least leaving the area where they last served in the
military. All of these factors combine to create a high likelihood that it
will be difficult or impossible to secure the presence of important
witnesses in the event that an appellate court orders a retrial of a courtmartial. For all of these reasons, the military has a real, practical interest
in trying offenses once, without the yo-yoing between the trial level and
appellate level that is sometimes the cost of doing business in the
civilian criminal justice system.
Given these imperatives, it is a fair question why anyone ever
would have created an appellate review system that is designed to take
courts-martial where there was no controversy whatsoever – where the
accused pleaded guilty and raised no motions, objections, or issues at
183. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 45-46 (1976) (noting that, with respect to courtsmartial, “virtually all the participants, including the defendant and his counsel, are members of the
military whose time may be better spent than in possibly protracted disputes over the imposition of
discipline”).
184. See supra notes 177-180 and accompanying text.
185. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 805, art. 5 (2006) (“This chapter applies in all places.”).
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trial – and assign a government-funded appellate defense counsel to
flyspeck the record to see if there is any conceivable basis for throwing
out the findings and sentence and forcing a retrial. This state of affairs is
particularly hard to defend when civilian society – with none of the
military’s unique interests in finality – would never allow defendants to
plead out at the trial level and then simply continue the fight on
appeal. 186 Of course, the short answer is that nobody really did create
this system for modern-day courts-martial; it just sort of happened.
Providing for mandatory appellate review of guilty plea cases may have
made sense when Congress enacted the UCMJ in 1950, but changes in
court-martial practice remove whatever justification existed for the
expansive appellate jurisdiction Congress created. Simply put, this isn’t
your grandfather’s military justice system.
When Congress enacted the UCMJ in 1950, the court-martial
system provided therein lacked many of the safeguards that military
accuseds take for granted today. 187 The courts-martial that existed under
the UCMJ as first enacted did not even have a judge. 188 Rather, general
courts-martial had an assigned “law officer” who would provide legal
advice to the court and perform some of the functions of a civilian judge,
but who had none of the independence associated with a judge. 189 For
special courts-martial, there would not even be a law officer, with the
assigned court-martial panel being expected to preside over the
proceedings without the benefit of any legal advice or instruction
whatsoever. 190 This all changed, however, with the enactment of the
Military Justice Act of 1968. 191 The Military Justice Act of 1968
amended the UCMJ to create the office of military judge and required
that a military judge be assigned to all general courts-martial. 192 For
special courts-martial, the 1968 Act generally required appointment of a
military judge if the court-martial were permitted to adjudge a punitive

186. Indeed, just thirty-five years before enactment of the UCMJ, the Judge Advocate General
of the Army, General Enoch Crowder, advised the United States Senate that any appellate review of
courts-martial was incompatible with the military mission: “In a military code there can be, of
course, no provision for courts of appeal. Military discipline and the purposes which it is expected
to serve will not permit of the vexatious delays incident to the establishment of an appellate
procedure.” S. REP. NO.130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35, quoted in Wiener, supra note 11, at 18.
187. See generally Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Military Justice Act of 1968, 45 MIL. L. REV. 77
(1969).
188. Id. at 81-82.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. The Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968).
192. Id. at 1335-36.
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discharge from the service. 193 This amendment to the UCMJ also
provided for an independent judiciary by ensuring that military judges
reported to the service Judge Advocate General and did not answer to
local commanders. 194
The Military Justice Act of 1968 was a similar watershed as it
related to an accused’s right to representation at courts-martial. Prior to
the 1968 amendments to the UCMJ, an accused had a right to qualified
defense counsel at special courts-martial only if defense counsel was
“available.” 195 However, most of the services had taken the position that
qualified defense counsel were not “available” for the defense of special
courts-martial, which meant that an accused’s assigned counsel for
special courts-martial typically would be a non-lawyer military officer
assigned to present the accused’s defense. 196 The Military Justice Act of
1968 changed this state of affairs, and required the services to provide a
qualified lawyer to represent accuseds at special courts-martial
empowered to adjudge a punitive discharge. 197 Moreover, while the
193. The Military Justice Act of 1968 left open the theoretical possibility that a special courtmartial authorized to adjudge a punitive discharge could proceed without a military judge if “a
military judge could not be detailed to the trial because of physical conditions or military
exigencies.” Id. at 1336. However, that standard is so exacting that it seems virtually impossible
that the government could survive appellate review of a special court-martial authorized to adjudge
a punitive discharge without having detailed a military judge to the court. As R.C.M. 201 explains:
Physical conditions or military exigencies . . . may exist under rare circumstances, such
as on an isolated ship on the high seas or in a unit in an inaccessible area, provided
compelling reasons exist why trial must be held at that time and at that place. Mere
inconvenience does not constitute a physical condition or military exigency and does not
excuse a failure to detail a military judge.
R.C.M. 201(f)(2)(B)(ii)(b).
194. Military Justice Act of 1968, supra note 191, at § 2 (codified at U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §
826(c), art. 26(c)); see also Wiener, supra note 11, at 63 (noting that, prior to the 1968 amendments
to the UCMJ, law officers assigned to courts-martial in the Navy and Air Force generally were
under the control of the same officer who convened the court-martial and referred the charges
against the accused for trial by court-martial).
195. See Ervin, supra note 187, at 83 (“Although the Uniform Code originally provided that an
accused in a general court-martial must be represented by a lawyer counsel, it provided that an
accused in a special court-martial may be represented by his own hired civilian lawyer or by a
military lawyer of his selection ‘if reasonably available,’ or, otherwise, by an appointed non-lawyer
counsel.” (footnote omitted)).
196. Id.
197. Id. With respect to special courts-martial not empowered to adjudge a punitive discharge,
the statute still required the appointment of qualified defense counsel “unless counsel having such
qualifications cannot be obtained on account of physical conditions or military exigencies.”
Military Justice Act of 1968, supra note 191, at § 2 (codified at U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 827(c)(1),
art. 27(c)(1)). This “military exigency” exception for special courts-martial not empowered to
adjudge a punitive discharge was intended by Congress to apply only when it was truly impossible
to detail a qualified defense counsel because of geographic isolation or combat conditions, Ervin,
supra note 189, at 86, and the statute required a detailed statement in the record of the reasons why
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1968 UCMJ amendments left open the theoretical possibility that, in
certain extraordinary situations, the services could decline to provide
counsel at special courts-martial not authorized to adjudge a punitive
discharge, military practice after the 1968 Act had been to assign
qualified defense counsel for all special courts-martial. 198 In 1984, the
President amended Rule for Court-Martial 502(d)(1) to reflect this
practice and require, without exception, that qualified defense counsel be
detailed to represent the accused at all general and special courtsmartial. 199
When this evolution of the UCMJ is considered, it becomes more
understandable why Congress, acting in 1950, would create an appellate
review system that cut against the principles of finality and speed
underlying the rest of the UCMJ. 200 When Congress created this
appellate structure, it was designing an appellate review system for
courts-martial where there would be no judge, much less an independent
judge, and not even a “law officer” for special courts-martial. 201 For
special courts-martial, not only would there be no judge or law officer,
but the accused was not even being represented by a trained lawyer. 202
Thus, courts-martial as they existed upon enactment of the UCMJ had a
notable absence of any gatekeepers to protect the accused’s rights and to
properly advise him of his options. 203 In that context, one can see why
Congress might view even guilty pleas as at least potentially suspect and
erect an appellate review system to provide some degree of gatekeeping
for all courts-martial exceeding a stated punishment threshold. 204
But in present-day courts-martial, every single accused at a general
it was impossible to detail qualified defense counsel. Military Justice Act of 1968, supra note 191,
at § 2 (codified at U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 827(c)(1), art. 27(c)(1)).
198. R.C.M. 502(d), Analysis.
199. Id.
200. As Colonel Wiener has observed, Congress enacted the UCMJ and created civilian
appellate review of courts-martial at a time when virtually the entire English-speaking world was
doing the same. Congress enacted the UCMJ in 1950, while Great Britain provided for civilian
appellate review in 1951, Canada did so in 1952, New Zealand did so in 1953, and Australia
followed suit in 1955. Wiener, supra note 11, at 37. Of course, accepting the concept of civilian
review of courts-martial is not at all incompatible with the notion that the category of cases subject
to such review should sensibly reflect the various policy interests underlying the military justice
system, from the military’s needs to the accused’s legitimate interest in seeking appellate
vindication.
201. Ervin, supra note 187, at 89.
202. Id.
203. See id.
204. See Powers, supra note 173, at 465 (opining that the mandatory appellate review of
Article 66(c) “operates from a premise that the finding of guilty and the sentence reached by the
trial court are incorrect”).
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or special court-martial has trained legal counsel assigned to him at
government expense. 205 They also have an independent military judge
who does not answer to local commanders. 206 These enhanced
procedural protections at the trial level address the reliability concerns
that, in an earlier age, might have justified a bulky appellate review
system even when the trial-court process was structured to enhance
speed and finality. 207 This is particularly true where American society
has already concluded as a matter of policy that civilians pleading guilty
in federal court have a much more limited right to appellate review of
their cases. 208 To the extent that the anomalous nature of courts-martial
justified a more expansive appellate review system than that existing in
federal court, those days have long passed and cannot justify providing
less finality to court-martial convictions in light of the military’s
comparatively greater need for certainty and finality.
C. The Military’s Prohibition on Negotiated Appellate Review Waivers
Bucks the Trend of Allowing Accuseds to Trade Their Rights for
Sentencing Relief
Article 66(c) of the UCMJ, 209 which provides for mandatory
appellate review of courts-martial where the approved punishment
exceeds a statutory threshold, is not, by itself, the cause of the bloated
and unwieldy appellate review process that currently exists. Rather, the
real problem is the manner in which Article 66(c) interfaces with R.C.M.
705(c), which prohibits accuseds from waiving their appellate rights as
part of the plea bargaining process. 210 The argument against limiting a
servicemember’s plea bargaining rights flows from two facts concerning
the civilian and military criminal justice systems.
First, as discussed above, criminal defendants in the federal court
system, unlike their military counterparts, can bargain away their right to
appellate review as part of the plea bargaining process. 211 Indeed, a
waiver of appellate review is so standard a part of the federal court plea
bargaining process that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure even
specify the inquiry a federal court must make of a criminal defendant

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

R.C.M. 502(d)(1).
U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 826(c), art. 26(c) (2006).
See R.C.M. 707, Analysis.
See supra Part III.A.
§ 866(c), art. 66(c).
See id.; R.C.M. 705(c).
See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
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when a plea agreement includes a waiver of appellate rights. 212 Second,
the rules for military practice do not even prohibit an accused from
waiving his right to appeal, but only prohibit an accused from waiving
his right to appeal as part of a pretrial agreement. 213 A military accused
is permitted to waive appellate review, but can do so only after the
military commander who convened the court-martial has taken action on
the findings and sentence, meaning that a military accused can waive
appellate review only at a time where it is certain that he can receive
nothing of value for relinquishing this right. 214
That a military accused can waive appellate review, so long as he
receives no benefit for doing so, undermines any potential policy
argument for prohibiting the waiver of appellate rights as part of a
pretrial agreement. 215 The basis for R.C.M. 705(c) cannot be that there
is something so fundamental about the military appellate process that
appellate review should be inherently unwaivable, as the rules do permit
military accuseds, like their civilian counterparts, to waive appellate
review; the rules merely deprive the military accused of any incentive to
do so. 216 Rather, a sound policy rationale would have to point to
something unique to the military plea bargaining process itself that
supports allowing accuseds to waive appellate review so long as it is not
done as part of plea negotiations, keeping in mind that civilians are
regularly permitted to waive their appellate rights during their own plea
negotiations. 217
Indeed, R.C.M. 705(c) runs counter to the trend in both civilian and
military law of allowing criminal defendants to bargain away their most
cherished rights during the plea bargaining process. Most notably, in
United States v. Mezzanatto, 218 the Supreme Court held that a
defendant’s agreement, as a condition to entering into plea bargaining
discussions, that any statement he made in the plea bargaining process
would be admissible against him was enforceable against the defendant
even though the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Federal Rules
of Evidence provide that statements made in plea discussions are not
admissible against the defendant. 219 After acknowledging the general
212. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N).
213. R.C.M. 705(c).
214. Indeed, the Rules for Courts-Martial prohibit any person from offering a servicemember
an inducement, such as clemency, to waive appellate review. Id. § 1110(c).
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See supra note 105.
218. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
219. Id. at 210.
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presumption that constitutional and statutory rights are waivable by a
criminal defendant, 220 the Court observed that eliminating constraints on
the permissible subjects for a plea agreement furthers, rather than
undermines, the criminal justice system’s interest in encouraging
settlement of criminal charges:
Indeed, as a logical matter, it simply makes no sense to conclude that
mutual settlement will be encouraged by precluding negotiation over
an issue that may be particularly important to one of the parties to the
transaction. A sounder way to encourage settlement is to permit the
interested parties to enter into knowing and voluntary negotiations
without any arbitrary limits on their bargaining chips. To use the
Ninth Circuit’s metaphor, if the prosecutor is interested in “buying” the
reliability assurance that accompanies a waiver agreement, then
precluding waiver can only stifle the market for plea bargains. A
defendant can “maximize” what he has to “sell” only if he is permitted
221
to offer what the prosecutor is most interested in buying.

Apart from rights identified in R.C.M. 705(c), the military courts
similarly follow this “free market” approach to plea agreements by
generally allowing military accuseds to bargain away their rights in
return for the benefits that they are able to obtain through the plea
bargaining process. 222 For example, the military appellate courts have
upheld terms in a pretrial agreement that require an accused to agree to
trial before a military judge alone, thereby waiving the accused’s right to
trial by members. 223 Similarly, the military courts have upheld pretrial
agreements where the convening authority agreed to one sentence
limitation if the accused waived trial before members but would insist
upon a higher sentence limitation if the accused desired to be sentenced
by members. 224 Military accuseds may waive their right to challenge the
legality of a search and seizure, 225 or to object to hearsay evidence on
sentencing, 226 or to challenge venue, 227 or to assert a claim of illegal
pretrial punishment, 228 or to confront and cross-examine witnesses, 229 or
220. Id. at 201.
221. Id. at 208.
222. For an in-depth discussion of the development of military case law on waiver of rights in
the plea bargaining process, see Mary M. Foreman, Let’s Make a Deal! The Development of
Pretrial Agreements in Military Criminal Justice Practice, 170 MIL. L. REV. 53, 70-84 (2001).
223. United States v. Burnell, 40 M.J. 175, 176 (C.M.A. 1994).
224. United States v. Andrews, 38 M.J. 650, 650-51 (A.C.M.R. 1993).
225. United States v. Jones, 23 M.J. 305, 307 (C.M.A. 1987).
226. United States v. Gibson, 29 M.J. 379, 382 (C.M.A. 1990).
227. United States v. Kitts, 23 M.J. 105, 108 (C.M.A. 1986).
228. United States v. McFadyen, 51 M.J. 289, 289 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
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to insist on an Article 32 investigation of charges referred for trial by
general court-martial, the military equivalent to a grand jury
proceeding. 230
What, then, is the policy rationale for prohibiting military accuseds
from plea bargaining away their right to appeal when civilian defendants
are permitted to do so and military accuseds are generally allowed to
bargain away their other constitutional and statutory rights? The CAAF
explained its view of the rationale behind R.C.M. 705(c) in its recent
decision in United States v. Tate, 231 a case in which the court invalidated
a pretrial agreement term whereby the accused agreed not to seek parole
or clemency for twenty years. 232 The CAAF explained that the UCMJ
allows the military justice system to be administered principally by local
military commanders throughout the world, but vests review and
clemency functions with centrally-located appellate courts and senior
executive branch officials. 233 The court viewed R.C.M. 705(c) as
protecting this balance by eliminating the local commander’s ability to
affect the appellate review process through plea bargains that would take
away appellate review. 234 Based on that premise, the CAAF concluded
that R.C.M. 705(c) protects the accused in a plea bargaining process
where a power differential exists: “R.C.M. 705(c) recognizes that the
bargaining relationship between a servicemember and the convening
authority at the pretrial stage is fundamentally different from the
circumstances in which rights may be waived during trial and post-trial
proceedings.” 235
Putting aside whether this analysis is in fact the thinking that led to
the promulgation of R.C.M. 705(c), does that line of reasoning really
stand up to scrutiny? If R.C.M. 705(c) is really designed to keep the
court-martial convening authority from using plea bargaining leverage to
affect the appellate review process, the rule does an extraordinarily poor
job of it. As discussed above, the military justice system allows an
accused to bargain away a panoply of his constitutional and statutory
rights in a way that can make appellate review in many ways a hollow
exercise. 236 A convening authority is even permitted to enter into a
pretrial agreement whereby the accused waives claims of unlawful
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

United States v. Hanna, 4 M.J. 938, 940 (N-M.C.M.R. 1978).
United States v. Shaffer, 12 M.J. 425, 429-430 (C.M.A. 1982).
United States v. Tate, 64 M.J. 269 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
Id. at 272.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 271.
Id.
See supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text.
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command influence by the convening authority in the charging
process. 237 Moreover, it hardly makes good logical sense to address
perceived limitations on an accused’s bargaining power with respect to
his right to appellate review by taking away all of the accused’s
bargaining power, which is exactly what R.C.M. 705(c) does with
respect to an accused’s appellate rights. 238
Perhaps the best explanation as to why it might make sense to allow
an accused to bargain away many of his potential appellate arguments,
but not the right to appeal itself, is that the rule protects an accused’s
ability to get up on appeal, out of the clutches of a nefarious convening
authority, and then present evidence that he was improperly coerced into
pleading guilty or waiving other important rights in the plea bargaining
process. But R.C.M. 705(c) does not even really protect against that risk
particularly well. For example, R.C.M. 705(c) does nothing to eliminate
the theoretical risk that a convening authority might coerce an accused to
waive his appellate rights through threats external to the court-martial
process. 239 Rather, all R.C.M. 705(c) does is prevent a convening
authority using his role within the court-martial process to induce (or
coerce) an accused to waive appellate review. 240 A diabolical convening
authority, one hell-bent to eliminate an accused’s appellate rights,
theoretically could, after he takes action on the court-martial record,
threaten the accused with dangerous assignments or extra duties if the
accused did not waive appellate review, and therefore achieve his
malevolent goal that way. If the accused went along with the scheme
and waived appellate review, no one would ever know because the
record of trial would never go up on appeal. 241
Thus, in prohibiting plea agreement terms that waive appellate
review, R.C.M. 705(c) really protects only against the possibility that a
convening authority might use his legal status as the convening authority
in an illegal way to coerce an accused to plead guilty and waive some of
the arguments that he normally would be able to raise on appeal. One
237. United States v. Weasler, 43 M.J. 15, 19 (C.A.A.F. 1995).
238. R.C.M. 705(c) (“A term or condition in a pretrial agreement shall not be enforced if it
deprives the accused of . . . the complete and effective exercise of post-trial and appellate rights.”).
239. See id.
240. Id.
241. See R.C.M. 1110(g) (providing that a waiver of appellate review bars review of the courtmartial by a Court of Criminal Appeals and by the service Judge Advocate General). Of course, the
Rules for Courts-Martial prohibit any person from inducing or coercing an accused to waive
appellate review. See R.C.M. 1110(c). But if R.C.M. 705(c) is a prophylactic rule designed to
protect against the lawless convening authority who is determined to use his position unlawfully to
coerce a waiver of appellate rights, such a convening authority presumably would feel no
compunction about violating R.C.M. 1110(c) as well.
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theoretical example that comes to mind is that a diabolical (and lawless)
convening authority could coerce an accused to plead guilty, and to
waive all issues other than those that cannot be waived under R.C.M.
705(c), by telling the accused that he will use his power as convening
authority to appoint a “hanging jury” that is likely to convict the accused
and sentence him harshly. R.C.M. 705(c) would offer some protection
against this improbable scenario by ensuring that an accused is able,
once the convening authority has acted on the court-martial record, to go
up on appeal and assert a claim of unlawful command influence or
otherwise seek to overturn his plea of guilty.
But there are already other protections in the military justice system
against such malevolence. 242 An accused is assigned a defense counsel
whose duties run solely to the accused and not to the service or the
convening authority. 243 The defense counsel negotiates a pretrial
agreement on behalf of the accused, and presumably would be fully
aware of any illegal threats by the convening authority to taint the courtmartial process if the accused does not plead guilty and waive any
waivable appellate issues. 244 Moreover, each and every plea agreement
must be examined by the military judge, who also does not answer to the
convening authority, to ensure that the accused voluntarily entered into
the agreement and is voluntarily pleading guilty. 245 Included in that
inquiry is a requirement that the military judge question the accused to
ensure that all of the terms of the pretrial agreement, and any promises
made in connection therewith, are contained in the written agreement
itself. 246
Therefore, when one unravels the rationale behind R.C.M. 705(c),
the prohibition on an accused bargaining away his right to appeal at most
protects an accused in only two situations. First, the rule protects the
accused from having a convening authority legally insist that the accused
waive his right to appellate review if the accused wants to obtain a plea

242. See, e.g., U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §827(a), art. 27(a) (2006).
243. Id.
244. R.C.M. 705(d)(1) (“Government representatives shall negotiate with defense counsel
unless the accused has waived the right to counsel.”).
245. See R.C.M. 910(f)(4); see also United States v. Jones, 23 M.J. 305, 308 (C.M.A. 1987)
(noting the requirement that the military judge conduct an inquiry to ensure that the accused
understands the effect of all pretrial agreement terms, that the written agreement includes all
promises made as part of the pretrial agreement, and that the parties agree with the military judge’s
interpretation of the agreement); United States v. Green, 1 M.J. 453, 456 (C.M.A. 1976) (same).
246. See R.C.M. 910(f)(4) (requiring the military judge to inquire to ensure “[t]hat the accused
understands the agreement” and “[t]hat the parties agree to the terms of the agreement”); see also
R.C.M. 705(d)(2) (“All terms, conditions, and promises between the parties shall be written.”).
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agreement by making such negotiations illegal. 247 Of course, an accused
has no right to a pretrial agreement in the first place, 248 so it is
questionable at best whether it makes any sense to deprive the accused
of a bargaining chip in the pretrial process on that basis.
Second, R.C.M. 705(c) protects an accused from being illegally
coerced to plead guilty and waive important appellate rights. But this
protection would come into play only in those instances where the
accused and/or his counsel affirmatively lie to the military judge by
failing to disclose at trial that the convening authority procured the
pretrial agreement through illegal threats, and then only where the
accused (after lying to the military judge at trial) tells the truth to the
appellate courts. To protect against this improbable scenario, the
military justice system erects a system of appellate review that
essentially ensures that all courts-martial, even those where the accused
has pleaded guilty and raised no motions at trial, are subjected to fullblown appellate review once the approved sentence exceeds a modest
threshold. 249 To say this is a case of the tail wagging the dog understates
the issue, as the problem purportedly addressed by Rule 705(c) is
smaller than the proverbial “tail,” and the resulting burden on the
military justice system as a whole is considerably larger than the “dog.”
D. Mandatory Appellate Review of Guilty Plea Cases Encourages
Undesirable Litigation Conduct
The essence of a plea bargain is that the litigants stop fighting, with
the defendant relinquishing his right to contest the charges against him
in return for dismissal of certain of the charges and/or sentencing
relief. 250 But that is not the way it works in the military justice system,
as a plea bargain does not end the fight, but only shifts the fight to the
military appellate courts, where the accused can take positions directly
contrary to those he took at trial in the hopes of obtaining appellate
relief.
Moreover, the peculiarities of military practice impose
considerable burdens on the military in those cases in which the accused
is successful in this about-face strategy.
The cornerstone of a plea bargain in the military justice system is
that the accused agrees to plead guilty to specified charges in return for
247. See R.C.M. 705.
248. United States v. Straight, 42 M.J. 244, 247 (C.A.A.F. 1995); United States v. Conklan, 41
M.J. 800, 804 (C.A.A.F. 1995); United States v. Helweg, 32 M.J. 129, 134 (C.M.A. 1991).
249. See U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(b), art. 66(b) (2006).
250. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971); Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
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the convening authority’s agreement to place limitations on the
accused’s sentence and/or to drop some of the charges against the
accused. 251 That is, when the accused has a pretrial agreement, he is
getting something in return for successfully pleading guilty, and the
accused therefore is motivated to have the military judge accept his
guilty pleas. 252 This process is complicated somewhat because the
military does not recognize Alford pleas, 253 where an accused can plead
guilty without admitting his guilt. 254 Rather, a military accused pleading
guilty at a court-martial must admit his guilt and, in response to a
providence inquiry from the military judge, admit facts sufficient to
establish his guilt of the charged offense. 255 Therefore, in order for an
accused to obtain the benefits of his pretrial agreement, he must be an
advocate at trial of his own guilt in convincing the military judge to
accept his plea. 256
Having made that deal, and advocated at trial that his providence
inquiry establishes his guilt, an accused often has every incentive to take
precisely the opposite position on appeal. Armed with a new,
government-funded, appellate defense counsel, the accused is permitted
under military practice to go up on appeal and argue that the military
judge should not have accepted the accused’s guilty pleas, the very pleas
the accused urged the military judge to accept, by arguing that material
came out at the court-martial that was inconsistent with the accused’s
guilty pleas. 257 If the accused succeeds in convincing a military
appellate court that the military judge erred in accepting his guilty pleas,
the accused’s conviction will be overturned and the case remanded for
further proceedings.
The accused’s institutional incentive to challenge his own plea of
guilty on appeal is a direct product of the UCMJ. Article 63 of the
UCMJ provides that on a rehearing, the approved sentence for a charge
251. R.C.M. 705(b). The convening authority also sometimes agrees to refer the charges
against the accused to a particular type of court-martial in return for the accused’s agreement to
plead guilty to some or all of the charges preferred against him. See R.C.M. 705(b)(2)(A).
252. See, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260-61 (1971).
253. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
254. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
255. See R.C.M. 910(e) (“The military judge shall not accept a plea of guilty without making
such inquiry of the accused as shall satisfy the military judge that there is a factual basis for the
plea. The accused shall be questioned under oath about the offenses.”).
256. See id.
257. This is not a mere theoretical problem. The military justice case reporters are replete with
cases of an accused contending on appeal that his guilty plea was improvident. See supra note 123
(citing a sample of cases in which accuseds argued on appeal that their guilty pleas at trial were
improvident).
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may not exceed that approved at the first court-martial. 258 Therefore, if
an accused can convince a military appellate court to throw out his guilty
pleas as improvident, the accused can go back to the court-martial and
plead not guilty, or he can plead guilty once again and clear up whatever
defects existed in the original providence inquiry. Either way, the
accused’s approved sentence on rehearing can only stay the same or get
better at the second court-martial. 259
The one quasi-exception to this principle arises when the accused’s
approved sentence from his first court-martial was reduced from that
adjudged at trial because of a pretrial agreement. 260 In such a case, if the
accused fails to abide by his pretrial agreement on rehearing, then the
maximum available sentence is the sentence actually adjudged, and not
the sentence as reduced by the convening authority. 261 For example,
imagine an accused is charged with aggravated assault. 262 The accused
enters into a pretrial agreement whereby he agrees to plead guilty to the
charge in return for suspension of all confinement in excess of two
years. The accused pleads guilty and is sentenced to five years’
confinement, and the convening authority duly suspends all confinement
in excess of two years. If, on appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals
finds the accused’s guilty plea improvident, the approved sentence on
rehearing cannot exceed that approved at the first court-martial – two
years’ confinement with another three years’ confinement suspended –
so long as the accused continues to plead guilty as required by his
pretrial agreement. 263 If, however, the accused decides to plead not
guilty at his rehearing or otherwise breaches his pretrial agreement, he
loses the benefit of his pretrial agreement but still has his confinement
capped at the five years adjudged at his prior court-martial. 264
But where the accused “beats the deal,” and is adjudged a sentence
at trial that is not reduced by a pretrial agreement, he has absolutely
nothing to lose by trying to overturn his prior guilty pleas and taking his
shot at a rehearing. 265 Thus, taking the example from the previous
paragraph, assume the accused entered into a pretrial agreement whereby
he agreed to plead guilty to the aggravated assault charge and the
convening authority agreed to suspend all confinement in excess of two
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 863, art. 63 (2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also R.C.M. 810(d)(2).
See U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 928, art. 128 (2006).
R.C.M. 810(d)(1).
U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 863, art. 63; R.C.M. 810(d)(2).
U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 863, art. 63.
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years. At trial, however, the military judge (who is not aware of the
sentence limitations in the accused’s pretrial agreement) 266 sentences the
accused to confinement for only one year. In that case, the pretrial
agreement did not actually reduce the accused’s sentence, although it
provided the accused certainty that, no matter what happened at trial, his
confinement would be capped at two years. After trial, however, the
accused knows that the pretrial agreement did not actually reduce his
sentence, and has nothing to lose by advocating on appeal that his own
voluntary plea of guilty be thrown out and the case remanded, because
the worst the accused can do on rehearing is the one year of confinement
he already has, and he can do even better if he is acquitted on retrial or is
convicted but sentenced to less than one year in confinement. 267
Similarly, it is a fairly common practice for a convening authority
to take relatively serious charges that ordinarily might be referred to a
general court-martial and agree to refer them to a special court-martial,
which cannot adjudge confinement in excess of one year, 268 in return for
the accused’s agreement to plead guilty to the charges at the less severe
forum. 269 Take, for instance, an accused charged with two specifications
of drug distribution. At a general court-martial, the accused could be
sentenced to fifteen years’ confinement for each specification, or a total
of thirty years’ confinement. 270 A convening authority might agree to a
“bareback special” pretrial agreement where he agrees to refer the
charges to a special court-martial in return for the accused’s agreement
to plead guilty to the charges. Thus, even if the accused is sentenced to
confinement for one year, the maximum allowed at a special courtmartial, the accused still has obtained a significant sentencing benefit
from his pretrial agreement because he capped his confinement at one
year by agreeing to plead guilty at a lesser forum. In such a case,
however, the UCMJ provides an institutionalized incentive for the
accused to try to get his guilty pleas overturned on appeal. Having
already obtained the significant sentencing benefit provided by referral
of the charges to a lesser forum, the accused can keep the benefit of his
pretrial agreement (which effectively capped his confinement at one
266. See R.C.M. 910(f)(3) (providing that the military judge shall not be advised of the
sentence limitation terms of a pretrial agreement until he has adjudged a sentence at the courtmartial).
267. R.C.M. 810(d)(1).
268. U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 819, art. 19.
269. See R.C.M. 705(b)(2)(A) (noting that a pretrial agreement may involve an agreement by
the convening authority to refer the charges to a particular type of court-martial).
270. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, Part IV (2005), 37(e)(2) (setting
maximum punishment for a specification of drug distribution).
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year) even if he decides to plead not guilty at a rehearing, as Article 63
of the UCMJ caps confinement at the one year previously adjudged even
if the accused violates his pretrial agreement.
A recent case demonstrates the perverse incentives that exist even
outside the context of guilty pleas and providence inquiries. In United
States v. Tate, 271 the accused was charged with, among other serious
offenses, premeditated murder. Facing the prospect of confinement for
life without the possibility of parole, the accused entered into a pretrial
agreement that would suspend all confinement in excess of fifty years. 272
The pretrial agreement included an additional term, however, one in
which the accused agreed neither to seek nor accept clemency or parole
for the first twenty years of his confinement. 273 Presumably, this
provision was inserted into the pretrial agreement in order to give
assurance to the convening authority that he could provide Tate with
sentencing protection while still ensuring that Tate would remain off the
streets for a considerable period of time, as the rules that then existed
would have made Tate eligible for consideration for clemency after only
five years and for parole consideration after only ten years. 274 At Tate’s
court-martial, he was convicted of premeditated murder and other
offenses, and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 275 As
required under the pretrial agreement, the convening authority
suspended all confinement in excess of fifty years. 276
On appeal, however, Tate argued that the military appellate courts
should throw out the portions of his pretrial agreement affecting the
availability of clemency and parole. 277 Tate argued that these provisions
– which the accused presumably had used to induce the convening
authority into capping confinement at fifty years – violated public policy
and R.C.M. 705(c), which prohibits pretrial agreements from interfering
with “the complete and effective exercise of post-trial and appellate
rights.” 278 The CAAF agreed, and held that the provision in the pretrial
agreement affecting Tate’s eligibility for clemency and parole was
unenforceable, even though Tate reaped a significant benefit from

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

United States v. Tate, 64 M.J. 269 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 269.
Tate, 64 M.J. at 269.
Id.
R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B).
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making that offer in dodging a sentence of confinement for life without
the possibility of parole. 279
Putting aside whether the CAAF’s resolution of the legal issue in
Tate was correct, do we really want to have a military justice system that
allows an accused to urge a military judge to accept a pretrial agreement
a trial and then get up on appeal and have his new appellate defense
counsel argue that the very terms that the accused negotiated, accepted,
and urged the military judge to accept should be thrown out? Do we
really want a system that creates an institutional incentive for accuseds
to plead guilty at trial, and urge the military judge to accept their pleas,
and then turn around and tell an appellate court that the military judge
erred in accepting the very pleas that the accused urged the military
judge to accept? One could reasonably argue that these perverse
incentives are overstated because the standard for trying to overturn a
guilty plea as improvident is fairly high, requiring a showing that matters
submitted at the court-martial are materially inconsistent with the
accused’s plea of guilty. 280 But that high standard makes this process
even more perverse, as countless hours are devoted to appeals of guilty
plea cases – from preparation of a record of trial straight through
drafting of an appellate opinion – where there is little prospect of
success, and where there is “success” it seems unwarranted given the
positions taken by the accused at trial. And the beauty of it all is that the
United States government is footing the bill by assigning appellate
defense counsel 281 to assist an accused in making arguments directly
inconsistent with the positions he and his prior government-funded
defense counsel asserted at trial. 282
The harm suffered by the military from such conduct extends
beyond the mere cost of funding an appeal. When an accused is facing
trial by court-martial, the government presumably is ready to try its case
on the merits. When the accused takes a pretrial agreement and pleads
guilty, there is no trial on the merits. Now, fast-forward a year or two,
and in those cases in which the appellate courts find the accused’s plea
improvident, the government is in a far worse position vis-à-vis actually
trying the merits of the case than it was when the accused pleaded guilty.
Years have passed. Memories fade. Witnesses scatter. In the military
context, it is more than possible that key witnesses will be deployed
overseas, or on a ship, or in a combat zone.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Tate, 64 M.J. at 272.
See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.D.
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Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized these unique logistical
difficulties in upholding the military appellate courts’ power to reassess
a sentence, rather than remand for new sentencing proceedings, when
some but not all charges are dismissed on appeal:
[T]he nature of a court-martial proceeding makes it impractical and
unfeasible to remand for the purpose of sentencing alone. Even
petitioner admits that it would now, six years after the trial, be
impractical to attempt to reconvene the court-martial that decided the
case originally. A court-martial has neither continuity nor situs and
often sits to hear a single case. Because of the nature of military
service, the members of a court-martial may be scattered throughout
the world within a short time after a trial is concluded. 283

Thus, all of the practical realities unique to court-martial practice
make it much harder for the military to try a court-martial two years
down the road from when it was first ready to proceed with trial, and the
only reason for the delay is that the accused agreed to plead guilty as
part of a pretrial agreement in the first place.
The civilian courts have a term for the type of chicanery that the
military justice system encourages, where a defendant urges the trial
judge to do something and then argues to an appellate court that the trial
judge erred in complying. It is called “invited error,” and defendants are
regularly barred from urging error under such circumstances. 284 There is
no reason why the military justice system should be constructed in a way
that not only fails to discourage invited error, but regularly gives the
accused an incentive to make such arguments.

283. Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 569, 579-80 (1957).
284. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 405 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A defendant cannot
insist during trial that the jury be kept in ignorance yet demand after its end that he receive a lower
sentence because the jury did not pass on the very issue that had been withheld at his request.”);
United States v. Martin, 119 F. App’x. 645, 649 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Though [defendant] never
expressly requested that the two charges be tried together, a joint trial was the obvious consequence
of counsel’s request to have the charges consolidated. She therefore invited any potential joinder
error in this case.”); United States v. Collins, 372 F.3d 629, 635 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[A] defendant in a
criminal case cannot complain of error which he himself has invited.” (quoting United States v.
Herrera, 23 F.3d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1994))); United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1289 (11th Cir.
2003) (“Importantly, however, even plain error review is unavailable in cases where a criminal
defendant ‘invites’ the constitutional error of which he complains.”); United States v. LaHue, 261
F.3d 993, 1011 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The invited error doctrine prevents a party from inducing action
by a court and later seeking reversal on the ground that the requested action was in error.” (quoting
United States v. Edward J., 224 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 2000))).
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E. Mandatory Appellate Review of Courts-Martial Diverts Resources
From Court-Martial Appeals Involving Issues Actually Contested At
Trial
Heretofore, the arguments offered against the appellate review of
all courts-martial exceeding a particular punishment threshold have
focused on the competing interests of the accused and the military. But
the costs of this broad appellate review are not borne solely by the
military. Rather, the current rules for appellate review impose
opportunity costs that prejudice accuseds who actually contested their
guilt or raised other issues at their courts-martial. 285 Resources expended
in the appellate review process for a court-martial where the accused
pleaded guilty and raised no issues are resources taken away from
appellate review of a court-martial where an accused raised substantial
issues that he seeks to vindicate on appeal, and necessarily delays the
appellate review of truly contested courts-martial. 286
Given the
extraordinary delays that have arisen in the appellate review of courtsmartial in recent years, there is good reason to conclude that the
appellate system should weed out some portion of these guilty-plea
appeals so that cases raising substantial issues can move up in line for
appellate review.
In the past few years, the CAAF and service Courts of Criminal
Appeals have been confronted with a spate of cases in which the accused
has alleged a due process violation resulting from the inordinate amount
of time it has taken his case to proceed from the court-martial through a
decision on the first level of appeal. 287 The facts relating to the delay in
some of these cases do not paint a pretty picture. In United States v.
Moreno 288 – one of the leading post-trial delay cases decided by CAAF
– the accused was convicted of rape and sentenced to, among other
things, a dishonorable discharge and confinement for six years. 289
However, it took 1,688 days (or nearly five years) from the time of
Moreno’s court-martial for the Court of Criminal Appeals to issue an
opinion on the first level of appellate review. 290 By the time the CAAF
ruled in Moreno’s case, and incidentally reversed his conviction based
on the military judge’s failure to grant a challenge for cause, nearly

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 136.
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seven years had lapsed from the date Moreno was sentenced. 291 By
then, of course, Moreno had served his entire sentence. 292 The CAAF
found that the post-trial delay in Moreno’s case had the effect of denying
him due process, and in so doing excoriated the military for the
widespread nature of such delays:
Delays have been tolerated at all levels in the military justice system so
much so that in many instances they are now considered the norm.
The effect of this opinion is to provide notice that unreasonable delays
that adversely impact an appellant’s due process rights will no longer
be tolerated. 293

Indeed, in assessing claims of unreasonable post-trial delay, the
CAAF has explained that it can constitute a denial of due process, even
when the accused has not been prejudiced by the delay, when “the delay
is so egregious that tolerating it would adversely affect the public’s
perception of the fairness and integrity of the military justice system.” 294
Under that standard, the CAAF has found that delays in appellate review
of a number of cases were so lengthy and indefensible that the public
would view these delays as negatively affecting the fairness of the courtmartial system as a whole. 295
One of the factors causing delays in appellate review has been what
the CAAF has called the “extremely large caseload” assigned to
appellate defense counsel. 296 That is, appellate defense counsel are, at
times, assigned so many cases that they cannot review the records of
trial and brief them all without taking multiple extensions of time, which
creates much of the inordinate post-trial delay that the CAAF has found
inconsistent with due process rights. But as discussed in Part II of this
Article, court-martial accuseds compete against each other not only for
the attention of their assigned appellate defense counsel, but also for the
time spent by court reporters transcribing courts-martial proceedings;
and of trial counsel, defense counsel, and military judges reviewing and
authenticating the record of trial; and of defense counsel preparing
291. Id. at 133.
292. See id.
293. Id. at 143.
294. United States v. Harvey, 64 M.J. 13, 24 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
295. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Haney, 64 M.J. 101, 102 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v.
Gosser, 64 M.J. 93, 99 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353, 362 (C.A.A.F.
2006); see also United States v. Dearing, 63 M.J. 478, 488 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (holding that post-trial
delay amounted to a due process violation where the accused had demonstrated prejudice arising
from the delay).
296. Haney, 64 M.J. at 108; see also Moreno, 63 M.J. at 137 (“While appellate defense
counsel’s caseload is the underlying cause of much of this period of delay . . . .”).
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clemency packages; and of command staff judge advocates preparing
recommendations for the convening authority; and of convening
authorities acting on the adjudged findings and sentence; and of
appellate judges considering and ruling on whatever issues are raised on
appeal. 297
Flooding the appellate review pipeline with cases where the
accused pleaded guilty and raised no issues at trial, but where the
accused has a statutory entitlement to the same full-blown appellate
review as any other accused, unquestionably imposes costs on the
government, many of which are detailed above. 298 But the biggest
victim of this one-size-fits-all appellate review process might be the
accused who vigorously asserted his innocence at trial but is languishing
in confinement while the appellate review process deals with unworthy
appeals that are ahead of him in the appellate pipeline. While it is true
that part of this problem can be fixed by devoting additional personnel
and resources at all levels of the appellate review process, from court
reporters to appellate judges, it would be foolish to survey the problem
of post-trial delay without considering whether the appellate review
system can be reformed in a way that streamlines the appellate review
process while simultaneously protecting the legitimate rights of accused
as recognized by American notions of criminal justice and due process.
IV. A MARKET-BASED REFORM OF THE MILITARY APPELLATE
PROCESS
Two levers are at work to create the mindlessly uniform system of
appellate review that currently exists. Article 66(c) of the UCMJ
requires full-blown appellate review of all courts-martial where the
approved punishment includes a punitive discharge or confinement for
one year or more, unless the accused has waived or withdrawn appellate
review. 299 R.C.M. 705(c) ensures that virtually no accuseds will waive
or withdraw appellate review because the rule prohibits the waiver of
appellate review as part of a plea bargain negotiation, and instead allows
an accused to waive appellate review only after the convening authority
has acted. 300 In fact, because the military provides an accused with
appellate defense counsel at government expense, it is actually easier for
the accused to go forward with appellate review than to waive it
297.
298.
299.
300.

See supra Part II.
See supra notes.49-90 and accompanying text.
U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(b), art. 66(b) (2006).
R.C.M. 705(c).
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(because he doesn’t have to bother himself with signing anything), and it
does not cost the accused a dime to do so. 301 For that reason, even the
completely ambivalent accused almost invariably goes through with
appellate review because there is no effort required to do so.
Because the flood of court-martial appeals arises from the
combined effect of these two rules, adjusting either the scope of
appellate review provided under Article 66(b) or R.C.M. 705(c)’s
prohibition on dealing away appellate rights potentially could remedy
the problem. Therefore, one possibility would be to permit appellate
review of a smaller universe of cases. For example, the UCMJ could be
amended to conform to civilian practice and require that an accused file
a notice of appeal if he desires to appeal his court-martial conviction or
sentence. Such a change, however, seems likely to be both unworkable
and ineffective. Courts-martial take place all over the world, but appeals
are centralized in Washington, D.C., in the Courts of Criminal Appeals
and CAAF. Because appeals generally take place far from the locus of
the trial, it is impractical for the accused’s trial defense counsel to
continue with the case on appeal. When the trial defense counsel knows
that the case is going to be passed off to appellate defense counsel in
Washington, D.C., and that the appeal costs his client nothing in terms of
time or money, why would a trial defense counsel ever counsel his client
not to notice an appeal? Therefore, while requiring a notice of appeal
theoretically might peel off of the appellate review rolls a few of the
ambivalent accuseds, it seems more likely that their trial defense counsel
would convince them to take their shot on appeal because there literally
is nothing to lose. Thus, shifting to a notice of appeal system likely
would accomplish little other than adding an additional piece of
paperwork that an accused would execute in winding up his relationship
with his trial defense counsel.
Another possible way to lighten the appellate caseload would be to
increase the punishment threshold that triggers a right of appeal. For
example, Congress could amend Article 66(b) to allow review by the
Courts of Criminal Appeals only where the approved sentence is two
years or more (instead of one year), or eliminate an appeal by right to the
Courts of Criminal Appeals in guilty plea cases.
These are not new ideas. The service judge advocates general and
the judges on the Court of Military Appeals (the predecessor to CAAF)
made a recommendation to Congress as far back as 1953 that the UCMJ

301. U.C.M.J.,10 U.S.C. § 870(a), (c), art. 70(a), (c); R.C.M. 1202(a), (b)(2).
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be amended to make appeals from guilty plea cases discretionary. 302
Because there is no constitutional right to appeal of a criminal
conviction, 303 a narrowing of the cases in which an accused has a right to
appeal presumably would pass constitutional muster. While such a
scheme would reduce the number of courts-martial subject to appellate
review, and likely reduce the delays in post-trial review, it would slice
off the wrong class of cases. Raising the punishment threshold that
triggers Article 66(c) appellate review would deny appeals to accuseds
who vigorously contested their cases at trial, raising substantial legal
issues, but whose sentences were relatively light. In a similar vein,
substantial legal issues can arise during court-martial sentencing
proceedings, and a change in Article 66(b) that denies a right to appeal
in guilty plea cases would effectively prevent servicemembers from
challenging, through an appeal of right, irregularities in sentencing
proceedings if they pleaded guilty to the charged offenses. Neither
change would get at what should be the target of any reform to the courtmartial appellate process, the relatively large number of cases where the
accused pleads guilty and raises no substantial issues at his courtmartial. 304
A better candidate for reform is R.C.M. 705(c). Amending R.C.M.
705(c) to allow an accused to waive his right to appellate review as part
of a pretrial agreement would not directly reduce the number of cases
eligible for Article 66(c) review, but its indirect effect likely would be
considerable. If pretrial agreements could include terms whereby the
accused waives appellate review, it seems highly likely that convening
authorities, presumably with prompting from their staff judge advocates,
would seek such waivers as part of pretrial agreements, and accuseds
who intended to plead guilty and had no real issues to raise at trial likely
would be perfectly willing to bargain away those rights in return for
sentencing relief. That is the beauty of attacking the size of the appellate
caseload through R.C.M. 705(c). Where tinkering with the class of
cases eligible for appellate review under Article 66(c) would
involuntarily take appellate rights away from convicted servicemembers,
amendment of R.C.M. 705(c) would eliminate appellate review only for
accuseds who are volunteers. That is, elimination of the right of appeal
is not forced on anyone, as any accused who truly values appellate
review, and intends to raise issues at trial that ultimately could be
302. Carlton L. Jackson, Plea-Bargaining in the Military: An Unintended Consequence of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 179 MIL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2004).
303. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110 (1996); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
304. See supra Part III.D.
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vindicated on appeal, can retain his appellate rights by refusing to
bargain them away.
This minor adjustment to R.C.M. 705(c) likely would address, in
large part, every one of the reasons identified in Part III of this Article
for doing something to address the universe of cases subjected to
appellate review. This change would further the military’s interest in
finality by eliminating appellate proceedings for a significant portion of
the courts-martial where the accused agrees to plead guilty pursuant to a
plea bargain. 305 The amendment also would bring R.C.M. 705(c) more
in line with civilian practice, and other aspects of military practice for
that matter, by allowing criminal defendants to bargain away their rights
in a way that allows them to negotiate a benefit for relinquishing those
rights. 306 Amending R.C.M. 705(c) also would eliminate much of the
undesirable litigation conduct that the current appellate review system
not only tolerates, but encourages. 307 Much of the undesirable litigation
conduct identified in this Article involves the accused inviting error by
advocating his guilt at trial in order to keep his pretrial agreement and
then taking the opposite position on appeal. 308 If you assume that the
standard practice would be that pretrial agreements would include
appellate review waivers, the accused motivated to protect his pretrial
agreement will plead guilty and there will be no opportunity for him to
do an about-face on appeal because the typical case would not be
appealable. And perhaps most important, if appellate review waivers
became a fairly common provision in pretrial agreements, which seems
likely if R.C.M. 705(c) were amended, it would have a considerable
effect on the size of the appellate caseload, and should allow the actors
in the appellate review process to focus on cases raising substantial
issues and speed the overall pace of post-trial processing. 309 Moreover,
by focusing on R.C.M. 705(c), a reform of the appellate review process
would affect only guilty plea cases, and only those guilty plea cases
where any potential appellate issues are sufficiently insubstantial that the
accused would rather have a pretrial agreement than a right to appeal.
There are two potential counterarguments against amending R.C.M.
705(c), but neither of them can overcome the substantial arguments in
favor of such a change. First, the argument can be made that allowing
appellate review waivers as an optional pretrial agreement clause would
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.D.
Id.
See supra Part III.E.
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have the effect of making it a mandatory clause, as convening authorities
might be unwilling to enter into pretrial agreements if the accused insists
on full-blown appellate review. But is that a concern really worth
protecting? An accused has no right to a pretrial agreement. 310 The
essence of the plea bargaining system is that the government conserves
resources by not having to litigate criminal cases in return for offering
the accused protection on charges and sentence. 311 Why, then, should
the military plea bargaining system encourage an accused to make a deal
at trial and raise no issues, and then have the accused inflict considerable
costs on the government through appellate review? There is nothing
wrong with requiring an accused to make a consistent choice between
peace and war. If he values his appellate rights, then he should decline a
pretrial agreement, if one is available only upon a waiver of appellate
rights, and fight with vigor at both trial and appeal. If the accused places
a greater value on reducing his sentence at trial, then he should enter into
the pretrial agreement and waive his right to appeal. To those who
would complain that the effect of an amendment to R.C.M. 705(c) would
make appellate review waivers a nearly mandatory clause in pretrial
agreements, this author can only state that he would certainly hope that
this would be the effect, as the current system of “peace at trial but war
on appeal” is indefensible.
The other, perhaps more difficult, argument is that if appellate
review waivers became a more or less mandatory provision in pretrial
agreements, there would be accuseds who will get appellate relief under
the current system but will get no such relief under a reformed system
because they will have waived their right to appellate review. As a
factual matter, this premise is undeniably true. But, again, is that an
interest worth protecting? Civilian courts are well past this concern, as
criminal defendants regularly waive appellate review of their
convictions, and those waivers are upheld so long as they are knowing
and voluntary. 312 As a result, there are unquestionably civilian accuseds
who have pleaded guilty to offenses of which they technically might not
be guilty, or might not be provably guilty, and the civilian justice system
nevertheless marches on with the response that accuseds desiring to
310. United States v. Straight, 42 M.J. 244, 247 (C.A.A.F. 1995).
311. United States v. Perron, 58 M.J. 78, 87 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (“There are numerous benefits to
pleading guilty [in accordance with a plea agreement]. A plea of guilty ensures the prompt
application of correctional measures; avoids delays; amounts to an acknowledgement of guilt and
acceptance of responsibility; and avoids the risks of a contested trial. Guilty pleas also help
preserve limited resources and relieve the victim[s] of the trauma of testifying.” (alterations in
original) (citation omitted)).
312. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
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vindicate themselves should not plead guilty at trial, and certainly should
not agree to waive their appellate rights. Moreover, the military justice
system’s requirement of a providence inquiry ensures that the military
accused, as opposed to his civilian counterpart, has at least convinced his
trial judge of his technical guilt of the offenses to which he has pleaded
guilty. 313
In that sense, the change in R.C.M. 705(c) proposed by this Article
still would be more protective of military accuseds than civilian practice.
While civilian practice typically finds waiver of guilt issues through
entry of a plea of guilty, reforming R.C.M. 705(c) would not affect all
accuseds who plead guilty, but only those who plead guilty pursuant to a
pretrial agreement in which they agree to waive their appellate rights.
Thus, the only affected accuseds would be those who, in assessing their
own priorities, would rather have the sentencing relief of a pretrial
agreement than the lottery ticket of appellate rights for accuseds who
raise no substantial issues at trial. It is not too much to ask for an
accused desiring to raise legal issues on appeal to raise and preserve
them at trial, where the court is often better equipped to deal with any
factual issues that might underlie the accused’s arguments. And if the
accused would rather not raise issues at trial because he wants the
benefit of a pretrial agreement, does it really make any sense to leave the
appellate doors open so that the accused can make those same arguments
later? If an accused who would get appellate relief under the current
system would lose that relief under an amended R.C.M. 705(c), the
reality is that any such loss would be the accused’s own choice, a
consequence of his decision that he is better off declaring peace than
declaring war.
V. CONCLUSION
In assessing the current state of appellate review in the military
justice system, the one argument that certainly cannot be made is that “if
it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” The military justice system recently has been
plagued with egregious delays in appellate review that are a direct
byproduct of an appellate review system that treats all courts-martial
alike once the approved punishment exceeds a modest threshold. But all
courts-martial are not alike. Sometimes, the accused pleads not guilty
and raises numerous legal issues through aggressive motions practice.
Sometimes, the accused pleads guilty pursuant to a pretrial agreement to

313. R.C.M. 910(e).
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an offense for which he has no colorable defense, and raises no issues
whatsoever at trial. Indeed, sometimes that accused even asks for the
punishment he ultimately receives, such as the disgruntled soldier who
goes absent without leave because he wants out of the service and then
asks the military judge to give him a punitive discharge when he is
caught and court-martialed. It makes little sense to accord both types of
cases precisely the same type of appellate review.
The root cause of the bloated military appellate process is R.C.M.
705(c), which prevents an accused from bargaining away his appellate
rights as part of a plea bargain. If this prohibition were removed, either
by presidential amendment of R.C.M. 705(c), or a congressional
amendment of the UCMJ to overrule R.C.M. 705(c), it would have a
salutary effect on the military appellate system. Court-martial appeals
would focus more on cases that were actually contested at trial, and
would limit the extent to which cases that were uncontested at trial
clogged up the appellate pipeline. And the effect of such a change on
accuseds would be perfectly fair, as no accused would be denied
appellate review unless he agreed to it, unless he decided that he was
better off with a plea bargain than appellate review of his court-martial.
The ambivalent accused almost uniformly could be expected to opt for
the pretrial agreement, which is exactly what should happen. The result
would be a more respectable military justice system; one that reflects the
military’s interest in finality and the accused’s interest in an expeditious
appellate review process, while ensuring that the only accused who
would lose their right to appeal are those who voluntarily elect to do so.
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